Background
Steven McAllister had previously pleaded guilty to third-degree sexual abuse involving a child. At his sentencing hearing, he was questioned about whether he had violated a no-contact order during the pendency of that case. When asked whether his contact with the child was in person or through electronic means, McAllister answered “electronic means.” When the prosecutor followed up and asked whether he had also met the child in person in Minnesota while the no-contact order was in effect, McAllister replied, “That is not true.” The State had evidence that McAllister had in fact met the child twice in person in Minnesota — once at a state park and once in a Walmart parking lot — while the Iowa no-contact order was in place.
The State charged McAllister with perjury under Iowa Code § 720.2 for knowingly making a false statement of material fact while under oath. The charge was tried to a jury. The child testified to the two in-person meetings, and the sentencing hearing transcript was admitted into evidence. McAllister testified in his own defense, claiming he was confused by the question about Minnesota because he believed it referenced a Minnesota no-contact order that did not exist at the time.
During trial, the district court amended the marshaling instruction to present the jury with two alternative bases for conviction: McAllister’s “electronic means” answer and his denial of in-person contact in Minnesota. McAllister objected, arguing he had no notice that the “electronic means” statement would serve as a basis for the charge. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and McAllister appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on both issues. On the jury instruction challenge, the court recharacterized McAllister’s due process claim as a variance challenge and held there was no fatal variance between the charging instrument and the proof at trial. Although the trial information did not specify which statement constituted perjury, the accompanying minutes of evidence included the full sentencing transcript and statements from investigators detailing both electronic and in-person contact. The court also noted that the State had specifically alerted McAllister at a pre-trial conference that the “electronic means” response could independently support the perjury charge, undercutting any claim of unfair surprise.
On sufficiency of the evidence, the court held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that McAllister knowingly made false statements. Responding “electronic means” to a question that offered “in person or through electronic means or otherwise” as alternatives was a reasonable basis for the jury to infer McAllister was denying in-person contact. As to the Minnesota question, the court found it reasonable for the jury to conclude McAllister understood the question referenced the Iowa no-contact order — particularly because McAllister himself acknowledged at trial that the preceding questions at sentencing concerned the Iowa order — and that he knowingly answered it falsely knowing he had met the child in person.
Key Takeaways
- A perjury charge is not limited to the specific statement highlighted by a witness in the minutes of evidence; when the minutes incorporate the full hearing transcript, all statements made under oath at that proceeding may serve as a factual basis for the charge.
- A variance between a charging instrument and proof at trial only requires a new trial if it prejudices a substantial right — here, no prejudice existed because the defendant had actual notice of the broader factual basis through both the minutes of evidence and a pre-trial hearing.
- An incomplete answer under oath — answering only “electronic means” when the question expressly offered “in person or through electronic means or otherwise” as options — can support a finding of knowing falsity if the jury reasonably infers the defendant was denying the omitted form of contact.
- A defendant’s claimed confusion about the scope of a question is a credibility issue for the jury; appellate courts will not substitute their judgment for the jury’s reasonable interpretation of the evidence.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that defendants cannot insulate themselves from perjury liability by giving technically incomplete answers under oath. By answering “electronic means” to a question that explicitly offered in-person contact as an alternative, McAllister effectively denied having in-person contact — and the court declined to treat selective silence as a shield against perjury. Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike should note that an answer need not be an outright lie to support a perjury conviction; a strategically incomplete response can suffice if the jury finds the defendant knew the full truth and withheld it.
The decision also clarifies Iowa’s approach to variance challenges in perjury cases. Courts will look to the trial information and the full minutes of evidence together when assessing whether a defendant had adequate notice of the factual basis for the charge. Where the minutes incorporate a complete hearing transcript and investigators’ statements, a defendant who also received pre-trial oral notice of the alternative theory faces a high bar in arguing prejudicial surprise.