Background
Jennifer Becraft pleaded guilty in two Bath Circuit Court cases. She pleaded guilty to first-degree trafficking in methamphetamine in one case, with a persistent-felony-offender charge dismissed, and to first-degree possession of methamphetamine in the other. The Commonwealth recommended five years for trafficking and 18 months for possession, with the sentences running concurrently.
Over the Commonwealth’s objection, the circuit court imposed what it called a hybrid or alternative sentence: three years in prison followed by two years of probation. After Becraft’s release, she was to be assessed for drug court and, if eligible, required to participate. The Commonwealth appealed the final judgments and probation order, arguing that the split sentence was unlawful.
The Court’s Holding
The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the sentence violated KRS 533.020(1). Under that statute and the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Moreland, probation is available in lieu of implementing incarceration, not as an additional period of supervision imposed after a defendant serves the prison term ordered by the court. The statutory scheme provides an “either/or” choice between imprisonment and probation, not a “both/and” option.
Becraft’s probation also could not operate as a suspension of unserved prison time because the circuit court ordered her to complete the full three-year prison sentence before probation began. The Court of Appeals therefore vacated both sentencing judgments and the probation order as unlawful. It remanded for an entirely new sentencing hearing at which the circuit court must impose a lawful, non-split sentence.
Key Takeaways
- KRS 533.020(1) does not permit a court to order a defendant to serve a prison sentence and then begin probation afterward.
- Probation is a statutory form of release or supervision in lieu of implementing incarceration, not an additional punishment that may follow completion of the imposed prison term.
- When a sentence is illegal because it exceeds the statutory authority to impose probation, the remedy is complete resentencing rather than preservation of only the incarceration component.
Why It Matters
The opinion reinforces that Kentucky trial courts lack inherent authority to fashion hybrid prison-and-probation sentences outside the statutory framework. Even when intended to facilitate treatment or drug-court participation, a sentencing arrangement must comply with the legislature’s limits on when probation is available.
For practitioners, the decision also confirms the breadth of the remedy: an unlawful split sentence requires resentencing in full, not merely deletion of the invalid probation provision.