Background
A Vernon Parish grand jury indicted Morris Eugene Perkins, II, on November 14, 2023, for first degree rape of a child under thirteen, La.R.S. 14:42, and pornography involving juveniles, La.R.S. 14:81.1. Following a four-day trial, a unanimous jury convicted him of both counts on October 23, 2025. At sentencing, the trial court described sexual intercourse with a twelve-year-old victim in the rear of an SUV while Perkins’s small child cried in a car seat. It also stated that Perkins took three photographs showing the victim’s anus, vagina, and breasts—one showing male ejaculate—and later distributed them to her.
On November 25, 2025, the Thirtieth Judicial District Court sentenced Perkins to mandatory life imprisonment at hard labor without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for first degree rape, which it designated a crime of violence. It imposed a concurrent thirty-year hard-labor sentence, also without those benefits, for pornography involving juveniles. Counsel’s appellate brief challenged the sentences as excessive. Perkins’s pro se supplemental brief raised juror replacement, jury polling, and ineffective-assistance claims.
The Court’s Holding
Chief Judge Elizabeth A. Pickett’s opinion affirmed both convictions and sentences but remanded for corrections to the minutes. The court declined to review excessiveness because Perkins made only a general sentencing objection and did not file a motion to reconsider or request a downward departure. Applying La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1(E), State v. White, 23-604 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/24), 381 So.3d 946, and State v. Jarrell, 25-1464 (La. 6/16/26), it held the sentencing claim procedurally precluded rather than deciding that the sentences were substantively appropriate.
The juror-removal claim was waived under the contemporaneous-objection rule. Juror No. 4 disclosed familiarity with people named in exhibits and prior secondhand knowledge of the incident, while maintaining that she could be impartial. Defense counsel suggested replacement out of an abundance of caution, and the prosecutor joined. Counsel also expressly accepted Alternate No. 1 after questioning about his familiarity with Randy Kennedy. The court found no showing that removal cast substantial doubt on the reliability of fact-finding and therefore no exception to the preservation requirement.
The polling claim failed on preservation and, alternatively, on the merits. An initial polling problem prompted the court to consider further deliberations, but counsel agreed to a new written poll to determine whether a clerical mistake had occurred. The second slips showed unanimity on both counts, with no objection. Relying on State v. Armstrong, 23-414 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/24/24), 387 So.3d 792, the court characterized the procedure as clarifying, not coercive. It rejected the McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (2018), claim because the record contained no explicit objection by Perkins to counsel’s admission of sexual contact. Claims attacking counsel’s strategy—including arguments about the victim’s reported age, other suspects, juror removal, and polling—were relegated to post-conviction proceedings for an evidentiary hearing. The court separately found no prejudice from the back-strike limitation because neither side used one, and no prejudice from alternating tender of jurors because Perkins used only ten peremptory challenges; it also found the unobjected-to alternating procedure barred on appeal.
Key Takeaways
- A general objection without a motion to reconsider sentence precluded appellate review of excessiveness under Article 881.1(E).
- Counsel’s agreement to juror replacement and repolling defeated preservation; the polling claim alternatively failed because the procedure clarified rather than coerced the verdict.
- No viable McCoy claim was preserved without an explicit objection to counsel’s concession; strategy-based ineffectiveness claims were left for post-conviction relief.
- Remand requires the verdict minutes to state the result on each count and the sentencing minutes to reflect the oral crime-of-violence designation.
Why It Matters
The decision is principally a preservation ruling, not broad approval of every challenged trial procedure. It illustrates the concrete consequences of general sentencing objections, affirmative agreement to jury procedures, and an undeveloped record concerning a defendant’s objection to counsel’s strategy.
The affirmance leaves the mandatory life sentence and concurrent thirty-year sentence intact. The limited remand concerns ministerial alignment of the minutes with the verdict and sentencing transcript, while the specified ineffective-assistance issues remain available for development through post-conviction relief.