Founds v. State — Maryland high court upheld the search and drug and body-armor convictions

Case
Andrew Campbell Founds v. State of Maryland
Court
Supreme Court of Maryland
Judge
Eaves (Larry Hogan, 2022)
Date Decided
August 7, 2026
Docket No.
No. 48, September Term, 2025
Topics
Fourth Amendment, Independent Source, Constructive Possession, Drug Offenses
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

After FedEx employees discovered approximately 19.6 pounds of marijuana in a package, law enforcement arranged a controlled delivery and saw Andrew Campbell Founds retrieve it. Detectives later found his vehicle at a residence where he rented an apartment. When Founds answered the apartment door, a detective smelled an overwhelming odor of marijuana and observed that Founds appeared extremely nervous. Officers detained him and conducted a protective sweep after learning that another person was inside.

During the sweep, officers saw suspected marijuana and a box resembling the delivered package. Their subsequent warrant application included those observations as well as information gathered before entering the apartment. Execution of the warrant uncovered more than 52 pounds of marijuana, psilocyn mushrooms, firearms, ammunition, approximately $80,000, drug ledgers, scales, and a bulletproof vest. The circuit court denied Founds’s suppression motion and convicted him, on an agreed statement of facts, of possessing at least 50 pounds of cannabis, possessing psilocyn with intent to distribute, and possessing body armor during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed.

The Court’s Holding

The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed. Assuming without deciding that the protective sweep violated the Fourth Amendment, the Court held that the independent source doctrine permitted admission of the evidence seized under the later warrant. Adopting the objective excision approach to the second prong of the test from Murray v. United States, the Court held that a reviewing court should remove information derived from the unlawful search and determine de novo whether the remaining affidavit establishes probable cause. Here, the untainted information did so.

The Court also held that the agreed facts supplied sufficient evidence of constructive possession under the four factors identified in Smith v. State: proximity, visibility or accessibility, mutual use and enjoyment, and a possessory interest in the location. A rational factfinder could conclude that Founds’s apartment operated as a stash house, that he possessed and had access to the entire apartment—including the second bedroom where marijuana and mushrooms were found—and that he had been near the contraband shortly before his arrest. Although the Court rejected the State’s broader suggestion that participation in a drug enterprise alone establishes possession of every item of contraband in an apartment, the totality of the evidence supported all three convictions.

Key Takeaways

  • When a warrant affidavit combines unlawfully obtained observations with independent information, Maryland courts must excise the tainted material and ask objectively whether the remainder establishes probable cause.
  • The Court did not decide whether the officers’ protective sweep itself violated the Fourth Amendment because the independent source analysis resolved the suppression issue.
  • Evidence of a stash-house operation may support constructive possession, but it is not sufficient by itself; courts must assess the full record under the four Smith factors.

Why It Matters

The decision establishes Maryland’s method for applying the independent source doctrine when an affidavit contains information obtained during an allegedly unlawful entry. If the untainted portion independently establishes probable cause, inclusion of the tainted observations does not require suppression.

The divided decision also highlights disagreement over deterrence. Justices Watts, Biran, and Gould dissented, contending that excision asks only whether a warrant could have issued and does not adequately determine whether the unlawfully obtained information actually affected the issuing judge’s decision.

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