People v. Coverdale — Michigan Court of Appeals vacates misdemeanor sentence, holds trial court could not rewrite plea deal over prosecutor’s objection

Case
People of the State of Michigan v. Jordan Scott Coverdale
Court
Michigan Court of Appeals (unpublished per curiam opinion)
Judge
ACKERMAN, P.J.; BORRELLO, J.; KOROBKIN, J.
Date Decided
November 5, 2026
Docket No.
No. 375244 (Clinton Circuit Court LC Nos. 2024-011675-FH; 2024-011676-FH); leave granted by unpublished order entered July 9, 2025 (Docket No. 375244)
Topics
Criminal law; plea agreements; sentence enhancement; prosecutorial charging discretion
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Jordan Scott Coverdale was charged in two Clinton Circuit Court files arising from an August 2024 assault on a woman he dated and his later struggle with arresting officers. In file no. 2024-011675-FH, he faced two counts of domestic violence, each with a third-offense notice under MCL 750.81(5) listing a 2017 aggravated domestic violence conviction and a purported February 3, 2022 conviction in Huron County, plus a fourth-offense habitual-offender notice. In file no. 2024-011676-FH, he faced police-officer assault charges, also with a habitual-offender notice. Under a plea agreement, Coverdale pleaded guilty to third-offense domestic violence (a five-year felony) and attempted resisting or obstructing an officer (a misdemeanor); in exchange, the prosecution agreed to dismiss the remaining counts and both habitual-offender notices, with sentences to run concurrently.

On January 27, 2025, the day set for sentencing, the prosecution learned that the 2022 Huron County domestic-violence conviction did not exist—the charge had been dismissed in a methamphetamine plea, and the LEIN entry was erroneous. The prosecution disclosed the error and sought an adjournment to move to set aside the plea, but instead filed a sentencing memorandum substituting a different predicate: a March 12, 2019 assault-and-battery conviction under MCL 750.81(1) against a victim with whom Coverdale resided and shared a child. Coverdale did not dispute the 2019 conviction or the qualifying relationship, but argued the notice was defective under MCL 750.81b, which requires the charging document to list the prior convictions relied upon. The trial court agreed with the prosecution that the 2019 conviction qualified under MCL 750.81(5), yet found the notice defective under MCL 750.81b, leaving only the 2017 conviction properly listed. Over the prosecution’s objection, the court sentenced Coverdale for second-offense domestic violence, a one-year misdemeanor—270 days in jail and two years’ probation, concurrent in both files—while leaving all of the prosecution’s plea concessions in place. The prosecution appealed by leave granted.

The Court’s Holding

The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of sentence in file no. 2024-011675-FH and remanded. The panel expressly declined to resolve whether MCL 750.81b—which by its terms references MCL 750.81(3) and (4) and was never updated after a 2016 renumbering—applies to third-offense enhancements under MCL 750.81(5). It held instead that, even assuming the statute applies and the notice was defective, the trial court’s disposition was unlawful for two independent reasons.

First, the notice error was curable by amendment. Under MCR 6.112(H) and MCL 767.76, a court may permit amendment of an information or enhancement notice absent unfair surprise or prejudice, and MCL 750.81b itself contemplates an “amended charging document” and imposes no filing deadline. Drawing on habitual-offender precedent (People v. Manning, People v. Hornsby), the court reasoned that substituting the 2019 conviction for the nonexistent 2022 conviction did not elevate the enhancement or the maximum sentence Coverdale faced; he had been charged with, pleaded guilty to, and was advised of the consequences of a third-offense felony from the outset, received the substitution and supporting documents more than a month before sentencing, and never disputed the conviction’s accuracy. The notice’s purpose—early warning of potential consequences—was fully served.

Second, and independently, the trial court exceeded its authority by sentencing Coverdale for a lesser offense while holding the prosecution to its concessions. Citing the separation-of-powers principles of Genesee Prosecutor v. Genesee Circuit Judge and the Supreme Court’s holdings in People v. Siebert and People v. Smith, the panel held that when a court will not impose the bargained-for result, it must alert the prosecutor and allow withdrawal from the plea; it may not impose a different bargain on the prosecution. The court rejected Coverdale’s claim that plea defects justified the outcome: under People v. Brown, the remedy for a defective plea is an opportunity to withdraw it, not a judicially revised agreement. The panel also noted Coverdale never sought to withdraw his plea below, filed no cross-appeal, and affirmatively asked that his plea stand, so it did not address the plea’s validity.

Key Takeaways

  • The court did not decide whether MCL 750.81b’s notice requirements apply to third-offense domestic-violence enhancements under MCL 750.81(5); the statutory-interpretation dispute remains open.
  • An error listing a nonexistent prior conviction in an enhancement notice is curable by amendment where the substitution does not increase the enhancement level or potential sentence and the defendant has notice and an opportunity to contest.
  • A trial court may not sentence a defendant to a lesser offense over the prosecutor’s objection while retaining the prosecution’s plea concessions; it must permit the prosecution to withdraw from the agreement.
  • The remedy for a defective plea is withdrawal, not judicial rewriting of the bargain in the defendant’s favor.

Why It Matters

The decision reinforces Michigan’s separation-of-powers limits on judicial alteration of plea agreements, extending Siebert and Smith to the situation where a court concludes an enhancement is unavailable rather than merely rejecting a sentence term. Prosecutors retain the right to withdraw when the bargained-for felony conviction cannot be imposed, rather than being bound to concessions extracted for a greater offense.

The opinion also provides practical guidance on defective enhancement notices: a mistaken predicate conviction does not permanently foreclose an enhancement if the prosecution timely discloses the error and substitutes a valid, undisputed conviction without increasing the defendant’s exposure. At the same time, by reserving the MCL 750.81b question, the court leaves unresolved whether the Legislature’s failure to update the statute’s cross-references after the 2016 renumbering exempts third-offense domestic-violence enhancements from its notice procedures—an issue likely to recur.

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