Background
In 2004, Gary Shaver was sentenced as a juvenile for three counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA) required him to register and report address changes. In September 2015, Shaver updated his registered address in anticipation of a move, but the prior tenant was not evicted on schedule and he was unable to occupy the new home. His registered address was inaccurate for 19 days. He was charged and pleaded guilty to failure to comply with the 2011 SORA’s registration requirements as a second and fourth-offense habitual offender, receiving six months in jail and five years of probation. After violating probation, he was sentenced to 40 months to 15 years in prison.
In 2021, the Michigan Supreme Court decided People v. Betts, 507 Mich 527 (2021), holding that the 2011 amendments to SORA were so punitive in their aggregate effect—through tiered classification, shortened reporting windows, in-person reporting requirements, and student safety zones—that retroactive application to offenders whose crimes predated the 2011 amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of both the federal and Michigan Constitutions. Following Betts, Shaver moved for relief from judgment in Tuscola County Circuit Court, asking that his 2015 conviction be vacated. The trial court granted relief without allowing the prosecution to respond. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the trial court violated procedural rules and, more significantly, that Betts did not apply retroactively to final convictions on collateral review.
The Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to address whether Betts applies retroactively to cases final after the period for direct review has expired.
The Court’s Holding
In a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Cavanagh, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that Betts applies retroactively to defendants seeking collateral review. The Court first confirmed that Betts announced a new rule of law: prior to that decision, Michigan courts consistently treated SORA registration requirements as a civil regulatory scheme rather than punishment, so a reasonable jurist at the time of Shaver’s final conviction would not have felt compelled by existing precedent to grant him relief.
The Court then held that the new rule announced in Betts is substantive, not procedural, under the federal standard derived from Teague v. Lane and its progeny. Substantive rules—those that forbid criminal punishment of certain primary conduct or prohibit a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants based on their status or offense—apply retroactively on collateral review. Betts did exactly that: it prohibited applying the 2011 SORA, as a whole, to individuals whose registrable offenses predated the 2011 amendments. That is a categorical bar on a class of punishment for a defined class of defendants, not a rule about trial procedure or the manner of determining guilt.
The Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ reasoning that Betts was not substantive because Shaver would have been required to register under any iteration of SORA. Because Betts invalidated the 2011 SORA in its entirety—declining to sever individual provisions—his conviction for violating the 2011 SORA could not stand. The Court also held that because the federal Constitution sets a floor of protection, and the Michigan Constitution may not provide fewer protections than federal law requires, Betts applies retroactively under state constitutional law as well.
Key Takeaways
- People v. Betts (2021), which struck down the 2011 SORA as unconstitutional ex post facto punishment for pre-2011 offenders, applies retroactively to defendants whose convictions became final before Betts was decided and who seek relief on collateral review.
- The Betts rule is substantive—not procedural—because it categorically bars the state from applying the 2011 SORA in its entirety to a defined class of defendants (those whose registrable offenses predated the 2011 amendments), placing that punishment beyond the state’s power.
- The Court of Appeals erred by characterizing the rule as neither substantive nor procedural; a rule that removes governmental authority to punish a group of people in a certain way is quintessentially substantive and therefore retroactive under Teague.
- Because Betts addressed the 2011 SORA as an indivisible whole and rejected severability, any conviction for violating the 2011 SORA’s requirements is subject to retroactive challenge by pre-2011 offenders.
Why It Matters
This decision resolves a significant open question left by Betts: whether its constitutional holding could be invoked by people already serving sentences or subject to supervision based on 2011 SORA convictions. By confirming retroactive application, the Court opens the door to collateral challenges from a potentially large class of individuals convicted of failing to comply with the 2011 SORA whose underlying registrable offenses predate the 2011 amendments. The State Appellate Defender Office had already launched a SORA Project anticipating this outcome; this ruling confirms that such relief is constitutionally required.
More broadly, the decision reinforces that when a court announces a rule prohibiting a category of punishment for a defined class of defendants—rather than merely regulating trial procedures—that rule reaches back to final convictions. Prosecutors and defense counsel in Michigan and other states with similar registry schemes should take note: constitutional rulings that invalidate entire regulatory-turned-punitive frameworks on ex post facto grounds are likely to carry retroactive force, regardless of when the underlying conviction became final.