Background
In January 2024, process server Tom Fuller arrived at Linda Sue Warren’s mobile home in Berrien County to serve her with an eviction order. Warren invited Fuller inside, then became agitated upon learning of the eviction, screaming and threatening to shoot him and sic her dogs on him. Fuller called for police assistance. Three Oaks Police Chief Carl Krause responded and learned en route that an active arrest warrant existed for Warren. On arrival, he found the front door open, with Fuller standing in the doorway and Warren visible inside. Krause entered to execute the warrant.
When Krause entered, Warren retreated to a back room and attempted to shut the inner door. Krause pushed through and repeatedly told Warren she was under arrest, but she continued to struggle, striking him on the arm. Fuller assisted in restraining her. Warren denied fighting or striking either man and claimed the body camera footage had been altered, but the jury watched the footage multiple times and returned a guilty verdict on the charge of assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer under MCL 750.81d(1).
Warren was sentenced to 60 days in jail with credit for 20 days served. At sentencing, the trial court assessed five points to Offense Variable (OV) 1 based on Warren’s threats to Fuller and five points to Prior Record Variable (PRV) 5 based on her being on bond for similar conduct in Indiana. Both assessments were later acknowledged as erroneous. Warren appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, her trial counsel’s effectiveness, and the sentencing variable scoring.
The Court’s Holding
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Warren’s conviction and sentence in full, remanding only for the ministerial correction of her Sentencing Information Report (SIR). On the sufficiency of the evidence, the court held that Chief Krause’s entry was lawful on two independent grounds: the outer door was open (rendering MCL 764.21’s knock-and-announce requirement inapplicable), and the active arrest warrant authorized entry under Payton v. New York, 445 US 573 (1980), since Krause had reason to believe Warren was present. The jury was entitled to credit Krause’s testimony about the warrant’s existence, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the lawfulness element of the resisting-and-obstructing offense was satisfied.
On the ineffective assistance claim, the court held that trial counsel was not objectively unreasonable in declining to request a jury instruction on the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest. Defense counsel’s strategy — conceding the lawfulness of the arrest and instead contesting whether Warren actually struck Krause — was consistent with the evidence showing an active warrant, and an unsuccessful trial strategy does not constitute ineffective assistance.
On sentencing, the court agreed that five points were improperly assessed to OV 1 (threats to Fuller were conduct related to a separate, uncharged incident rather than the sentencing offense) and that the five-point PRV increase belonged under PRV 6 rather than PRV 5. However, because Warren had already served her 60-day sentence and identified no ongoing collateral consequences, resentencing was moot. The court remanded solely to correct the PRV 5/PRV 6 misclassification in the SIR. The earlier clerical error in the judgment of sentence (reflecting 60 months rather than 60 days) had already been corrected before the appeal was filed, rendering that issue moot as well.
Key Takeaways
- A valid arrest warrant authorizes police to enter a suspect’s home without violating the Fourth Amendment when there is reason to believe the suspect is present, under Payton v. New York; Michigan’s knock-and-announce statute (MCL 764.21) is triggered only when an officer actually breaks open a door, not when the door is already open.
- Defense counsel is not ineffective for forgoing a jury instruction on the right to resist an unlawful arrest when the evidence supports the lawfulness of the arrest and counsel’s chosen strategy — contesting whether the defendant committed the act at all — is consistent with that evidence.
- Under People v. McGraw, OV 1 must be scored based solely on conduct relating to the sentencing offense; threats made to a third party during a separate, uncharged episode that merely precipitated the offense cannot support a points assessment.
- Sentencing errors that would ordinarily entitle a defendant to resentencing are rendered moot once the sentence is fully served and no collateral consequences are identified, limiting the appellate remedy to correction of the SIR.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the broad warrant-based entry authority recognized in Payton and clarifies that Michigan’s door-breaking statute is a narrow rule that does not constrain an officer who simply walks through an open door. Defense practitioners should note that the court left open — because Warren did not brief it — whether the nature of the underlying warrant (here, apparently a failure-to-appear on a local ordinance violation rather than a felony) could limit Payton authority, leaving that question for a future case.
The decision also offers a practical reminder on sentencing appeals: defendants who have fully served short jail sentences face a high bar to obtaining any meaningful resentencing relief, even where scoring errors are conceded by both sides. Counsel handling short-sentence cases should consider seeking a stay of execution or expedited appeal if sentencing errors are identified, rather than risking mootness before the appellate process runs its course.