Background
On July 26, 2021, Derrick Harris drove to Roosevelt Street in Cleveland, Mississippi, with co-defendant Malachi Butler and two cousins after learning that a man named Jakavion Johnson had robbed his sixteen-year-old cousin at gunpoint. Both Harris and Butler were armed. During the drive-by confrontation, Butler opened fire from the back seat. After Harris crashed the car into a mailbox and it could no longer move, he got out and continued shooting in the same direction Butler had been firing. Brandon Swain—a bystander who had no involvement in the dispute—was struck by a stray bullet and killed. Frederick Johnson, a nearby resident, was also struck twice in the back. Nine shell casings from three different weapon types were recovered from the scene. Harris fled to Texas with Butler and was apprehended in September 2021.
At trial, Harris was tried jointly with Butler. Harris’s theory of defense was self-defense: he argued Jakavion Johnson had begun firing first and that he returned fire to protect himself. The prosecution argued deliberate participation in a drive-by shooting. A defense of accident was not argued. The trial court proposed Jury Instruction C-13, which told the jury that killing by “accident and misfortune” when acting in self-defense was excusable. Harris’s counsel did not object and explicitly agreed to the instruction three separate times on the record. The jury returned guilty verdicts on first-degree murder and aggravated assault; Harris was sentenced to life plus twenty years concurrent.
On appeal, Harris argued for the first time that the combined self-defense and accident instruction confused the jury by implying it had to find the fatal shot was accidental in order to acquit on self-defense grounds—making self-defense harder to obtain, not easier.
The Court’s Holding
The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed on plain error review. Because Harris not only failed to object to Instruction C-13 but explicitly agreed to it three times, his challenge was limited to showing that the instruction resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. The court found no such error.
The court distinguished the case from Taylor v. State, 597 So. 2d 192 (Miss. 1992), the leading case on improper jury instructions combining self-defense with accident. In Taylor, the defendant argued only accident—not self-defense—yet the court gave a self-defense instruction, distracting the jury from the actual defense theory and placing self-defense “in a place of prominence in excess of that given the defense of accident.” Here the situation was the inverse: Harris argued self-defense and not accident. The combined instruction did not penalize Harris—it broadened the basis for acquittal by permitting the jury to acquit if the shooting was an accident occurring during otherwise lawful self-defense. That approach was consistent with Evans v. State, 797 So. 2d 811 (Miss. 2000), and Jones v. State, 827 So. 2d 21 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002), both of which affirmed similar combined instructions when the trial evidence supported both theories. Because Harris cannot show prejudice—the instruction gave the jury an additional path to acquit, not a narrower one—there was no plain error.
Key Takeaways
- When a defendant explicitly agrees to a jury instruction on the record, he is procedurally barred from challenging it on appeal; review is limited to plain error, requiring a showing of manifest miscarriage of justice—the highest threshold in Mississippi criminal procedure.
- A combined self-defense/accident-and-misfortune instruction (Taylor error) is not reversible when the defendant actually argued self-defense at trial; the risk of confusion identified in Taylor arises only when self-defense is not the defense theory and the instruction diverts the jury’s attention away from the real defense.
- When a bystander is killed during a drive-by shooting in which the defendant returned fire toward a perceived aggressor, the jury may find first-degree murder even if the defendant did not intend to shoot the bystander specifically—intent to engage in the dangerous conduct is sufficient.
- Defense counsel handling cases where accident and self-defense are both arguable from the facts should consider whether a combined instruction helps or hurts: it can broaden the jury’s acquittal options, but it can also introduce confusion about the defendant’s primary theory if not carefully managed.
Why It Matters
Harris v. State provides Mississippi criminal practitioners with a clear doctrinal map for the Taylor-error landscape. The core principle is that a combined self-defense/accident instruction benefits a defendant who is arguing self-defense—it gives the jury an extra ground for acquittal. The instruction harms a defendant only when self-defense is not in the case and the instruction distracts from the actual defense. Understanding the direction of the prejudice is essential to knowing whether to object, and this opinion makes that analysis explicit.
For defense counsel, the practical lesson is equally important: if you intend to challenge a jury instruction on appeal, you must object at trial and preserve the issue. Agreeing to an instruction three times on the record all but forecloses appellate relief. Plain error review in Mississippi imposes a heavy burden, and an instruction that arguably gave the defendant additional acquittal grounds will rarely clear that bar regardless of its theoretical deficiencies.