Background
Licensed bail bondsman Jay Steven Hubber sought to apprehend David Sandoval after Sandoval repeatedly failed to appear in court. Hubber and three others went to a Butte residence owned and occupied by William Harris, where Hubber confronted and tased Sandoval. During the ensuing struggle, Nicholas Jaeger obtained Hubber’s pistol and fatally shot Harris. The evidence conflicted about whether Hubber handed Jaeger the gun, threatened Harris, or intended any shooting.
A jury convicted Hubber of deliberate homicide by accountability and aggravated burglary but acquitted him of felony murder under an instruction prohibiting conviction on both alternative homicide theories. Hubber appealed, challenging the jury’s mental-state instructions, trial counsel’s failure to object to those instructions, the sufficiency of the accountability evidence, and rulings rejecting his claimed authority as a bondsman to enter or remain in Harris’s home.
The Court’s Holding
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed both convictions. The majority agreed that the trial court incorrectly gave a conduct-based definition of “purposely” for the result-based homicide offense and held that counsel performed deficiently by accepting it merely because it was a pattern instruction. But Hubber had not preserved the instructional claim, and the majority declined plain-error review because the instructions as a whole tied accountability to purposefully promoting or facilitating deliberate homicide. It also found no Strickland prejudice, reasoning that evidence of Hubber’s alleged threat and transfer or handling of the pistol supported an inference that he consciously facilitated lethal force.
The Court also held that sufficient evidence supported the accountability conviction and that Hubber’s statutory, contractual, common-law, warrant, and residence theories did not establish a legal privilege to enter or remain in a nonprincipal homeowner’s dwelling. Judge Christopher D. Abbott concurred on the sufficiency and bondsman-authority issues but dissented on ineffective assistance. He concluded that the erroneous purpose instruction prejudiced Hubber in a closely contested case centered on intent and would have reversed the deliberate-homicide conviction and remanded for a new trial.
Key Takeaways
- Giving a conduct-based definition of “purposely” for deliberate homicide by accountability was error, and counsel performed deficiently by failing to seek the applicable result-based definition.
- The majority nevertheless found neither reversible plain error nor a reasonable probability of a different verdict under Strickland when the instructions, arguments, and evidence were considered together.
- Montana’s statutory arrest-and-surrender authority for sureties did not, by itself, authorize a bondsman to enter or remain in a third party’s home, and the Court declined to decide whether a broader bondsman privilege might exist in other circumstances.
Why It Matters
The decision distinguishes instructional error from reversible error: even an incorrect definition affecting a central mental-state element will not necessarily overturn a conviction when the claim was unpreserved and the defendant cannot establish Strickland prejudice. The partial dissent underscores the competing view that a burden-lowering instruction can undermine confidence in a verdict when intent is closely disputed.
The ruling also limits what Montana bondsmen may claim from their arrest authority. A bond agreement and statutory power to arrest the principal do not automatically create a right to enter or remain in a third party’s dwelling.