Background
After a December 2024 confrontation, Casarrubia-Perez drove a Honda Accord that followed the victim’s vehicle. A passenger, Braxton Osborn, allegedly fired from the Accord’s rear passenger window, striking the victim in the back. Investigators reviewed surveillance footage, found physical evidence of gunfire, and obtained social-media messages in which Casarrubia-Perez linked himself to the shooting.
The State initially charged Casarrubia-Perez with first degree assault, discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle, and two firearm-use offenses. Under a plea agreement, he pleaded no contest to second degree assault, a Class IIA felony, and the State dismissed the remaining charges. The district court sentenced him to 10 to 12 years’ imprisonment, with credit for 342 days served.
On appeal, Casarrubia-Perez argued that the sentence was excessive and that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to complete depositions of witnesses despite an uncooperative victim and by advising him that he would receive a sentence of zero to four years.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence. The sentence was within the statutory range of no imprisonment to 20 years, and the district court considered relevant circumstances, including Casarrubia-Perez’s age, prior unsuccessful juvenile probation, substantial benefit from the plea agreement, and the seriousness and violence of an offense involving a firearm and an injured victim. His high risk to reoffend, gang affiliation, and unsuccessful probation history also supported imprisonment rather than probation.
The court held that the deposition-related ineffective-assistance claim was not stated with sufficient particularity because the assignment of error did not name or describe the witnesses counsel allegedly should have deposed. Mentioning “the victim and another witness” later in the argument did not cure the deficient assignment of error. The claim therefore was not preserved for postconviction review.
The record conclusively refuted the sentencing-advice claim. During the plea colloquy, Casarrubia-Perez acknowledged the offense’s possible 20-year sentence, confirmed that the court had promised no particular sentence, and denied receiving any undisclosed promise. Those assurances defeated his allegation that counsel advised him he would receive a zero-to-four-year sentence, leaving that claim unpreserved for postconviction review as well.
Key Takeaways
- A within-range prison sentence was not an abuse of discretion where the court considered the defendant’s history, plea benefit, risk of reoffending, and the offense’s violence.
- An ineffective-assistance assignment based on uncompleted depositions must identify or describe the relevant witnesses with sufficient specificity; details supplied only in the argument do not cure a vague assignment.
- A defendant’s plea-hearing assurances that no sentence was promised can affirmatively refute a later claim that counsel guaranteed a particular sentencing range.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores Nebraska’s strict preservation rules for ineffective-assistance claims raised on direct appeal. Appellate counsel must state the alleged deficient conduct with enough detail in the assignment of error itself, especially when the claim concerns unidentified witnesses.
It also shows the importance of the plea colloquy when a defendant later challenges counsel’s sentencing advice. Clear acknowledgments that the sentencing court retains discretion and that no undisclosed promises were made may permit an appellate court to reject the claim on the direct-appeal record.