Background
B.W. and S.K., both 14 years old, were dating. On June 1, 2021, they were together in B.W.’s basement when S.K. alleged she was raped. According to her trial testimony, B.W. initially engaged in consensual contact but then used force to compel her to continue. S.K. testified that B.W. choked her, slapped her face, pulled down her pants against her will, and ignored her repeated requests to stop. Law enforcement was notified and executed a search warrant. In August 2021, B.W. was charged with rape, a first-degree felony in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.02(A)(2).
A four-day adjudicatory hearing was conducted in September through November 2022. The magistrate found B.W. delinquent in December 2022. After B.W. objected, the trial court overruled the objection in August 2023. A disposition hearing resulted in community control, and B.W. appealed. The direct appeal was affirmed on March 31, 2025. B.W. then filed a petition for postconviction relief on March 24, 2025, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on two grounds: (1) his trial counsel failed to advise him to testify, and (2) his counsel failed to adequately explain a pre-trial plea offer.
At trial, a prosecutor offered a conditional plea deal: if B.W. passed a polygraph test, the charges would be dismissed; if he failed, he would admit to gross sexual imposition (GSI), a fourth-degree felony. B.W. rejected the offer and proceeded to trial. His counsel advised against testifying. B.W. maintained throughout that all activity was consensual.
The Court’s Holding
The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief without a hearing. On the first claim, the court held that a defense attorney’s advice regarding whether a defendant should testify is a tactical or strategic decision that cannot be challenged as ineffective assistance of counsel unless the defendant shows coercion or was unaware of the right to testify. B.W. failed to make either showing. The trial record indicated B.W. was aware he could testify, and his affidavits did not allege coercion or lack of awareness of his right to testify. The court rejected B.W.’s argument that he needed to testify to counter the victim’s testimony, noting that unsuccessful trial strategies do not constitute ineffective assistance.
On the second claim, the court held that B.W. failed to meet the requirements under Lafler v. Cooper for establishing prejudice from counsel’s failure to explain a plea offer. Under that standard, B.W. had to show that but for counsel’s ineffective advice, he would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it. The trial court reasonably questioned the credibility of B.W.’s affidavit supporting relief. B.W. consistently maintained throughout the case that he did not “compel, force, or coerce” S.K. to engage in sexual activity. However, accepting the GSI plea would have required him to admit that he compelled S.K. to have sexual contact by force or threat of force under Ohio law. This fundamental inconsistency between B.W.’s denial of culpability and what a GSI guilty plea would require undermined the credibility of his claim that he would have accepted the plea if counsel had explained its expungability.
Key Takeaways
- Defense counsel’s advice to a defendant regarding whether to testify is a tactical decision protected from ineffective assistance claims absent evidence of coercion or that the defendant was unaware of the right to testify.
- A defendant claiming ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure to explain a plea offer must show, among other things, that there is a reasonable probability he would have accepted the plea—and trial courts may question the credibility of affidavits containing internal contradictions or factual inconsistencies with the record.
- A defendant who maintains innocence throughout proceedings undermines his credibility when claiming he would have pled guilty to a crime requiring admission of guilt.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces Ohio’s deferential standard toward defense counsel’s tactical decisions in juvenile proceedings. Courts recognize that the choice whether to testify involves complex strategic considerations, and disagreement with counsel’s advice does not automatically constitute ineffective assistance. The case is particularly significant for how it treats postconviction challenges to plea negotiations: credibility assessments of supporting affidavits are within the trial court’s discretion, and internal contradictions (maintaining innocence while claiming you would have pled guilty) can be fatal to relief.
For juvenile practitioners, the decision underscores the importance of contemporaneous communication with clients about both the right to testify and the terms of any plea offers. It also illustrates how a defendant’s consistent maintenance of innocence can paradoxically harm postconviction claims based on rejected pleas, since accepting a plea ordinarily requires admitting conduct that contradicts those maintained denials.