Background
Todd Kopchak, a tier-III sex offender with 2017 rape convictions, was released from prison on April 10, 2025. The following day, he registered as required under Ohio law at the Muskingum County Sheriff’s Office. On June 13, 2025, Kopchak returned to update his address to “homeless” after an altercation forced him to leave his residence. Detective Perry informed him that homeless offenders must call the sheriff’s office daily to report their intended sleeping location and told him to appear on July 8, 2025 for his 90-day address verification.
Kopchak did not appear on July 8. He contacted the sheriff on July 10, stating he had been staying in Wayne National Forest, and appeared in person that same day. He was subsequently indicted on two first-degree-felony counts: failure to register under R.C. 2950.04(E) and failure to provide notice of a change of address under R.C. 2950.05(F)(1). A jury convicted him on both counts.
At sentencing, the trial judge imposed a mandatory indefinite sentence (11–16.5 years minimum) on the failure-to-register count and a definite 11-year sentence on the failure-to-notify count, ordered to run concurrently. Kopchak appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence supporting the failure-to-register conviction.
The Court’s Holding
The court reversed Kopchak’s failure-to-register conviction, finding insufficient evidence. The court noted that R.C. 2950.04(A) and (B) define the specific registration obligations sex offenders must fulfill: registering with the sheriff before incarceration and again upon release, and providing required information including photograph and residential address. Kopchak satisfied both obligations—he registered in May 2017 before his sentence and completed his post-release registration on April 11, 2025. The statute imposed no additional registration requirements during the alleged offense period (June 13–July 10, 2025), so Kopchak could not have violated a non-existent duty.
The court found a prohibited variance between the charged offense and the evidence presented. The indictment charged failure to register, but the State’s evidence actually addressed different violations: failure to appear for the 90-day verification appointment, sparse daily homeless-location calls, and inadequate descriptions when calling. These conduct patterns might have supported charges under R.C. 2950.06(F) (failure to verify) or additional R.C. 2950.05(F)(1) violations, but not the R.C. 2950.04(E) charge leveled. The court emphasized that homeless offenders have no statutory duty to call or appear daily—R.C. 2950.05 requires only a written notice with a “detailed description” of intended lodging for the next 30 days.
The court also addressed why alternative theories failed. A failure-to-verify charge under R.C. 2950.06(F) would have required the sheriff to send a seven-day warning letter to Kopchak’s last known address before prosecution could proceed—no such letter was sent. Moreover, Kopchak complied with the statutory 90-day verification deadline on July 10, 2025 (the 90th day when calculated under R.C. 1.14). The conviction was vacated with double jeopardy protection against retrial.
Key Takeaways
- Sex offender registration statutes are strictly construed: only duties explicitly imposed by statute can support a conviction, and no implied or administrative duties supplement those written in law.
- A variance between the crime charged in an indictment and the conduct proved at trial constitutes reversible error if it changes the name or identity of the offense—prosecutors must charge the correct statute for the evidence they will present.
- Homeless sex offenders have no daily reporting duty; R.C. 2950.05 requires only periodic written notice with detailed descriptions of intended lodging locations.
- Under the Reagan Tokes Act, trial courts must impose indefinite sentences (not definite sentences) on first-degree felonies committed after March 22, 2019, with a stated minimum term calculated individually per count.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the statutory boundaries between three distinct sex offender compliance regimes: registration (R.C. 2950.04), change-of-address notice (R.C. 2950.05), and periodic verification (R.C. 2950.06). It serves as a cautionary reminder that administrative expectations (the Sheriff’s “duty letters” instructing Kopchak to appear on July 8) do not create criminal liability if unsupported by statute. Prosecutors and law enforcement must ensure that the statute cited in the charging document matches the evidence adduced at trial; failing to do so invites reversal on variance grounds.
The decision also reinforces post-Reagan Tokes Act sentencing requirements, holding that trial courts cannot impose definite sentences on first-degree felonies committed in 2025, even when multiple counts are involved. The case will return to the trial court for resentencing on the failure-to-notify conviction, which will require the judge to impose an indefinite sentence with a stated minimum term calculated in accordance with R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) and a maximum term under R.C. 2929.144(B).