Background
David Johnson was convicted of aggravated menacing, a first-degree misdemeanor, and sentenced to 90 days in jail with a no-contact order requiring him to stay 500 feet away from his next-door neighbors. After serving 21 days, Johnson moved to modify his sentence, and the trial court granted the motion on August 29, 2025, removing the 500-foot distance requirement. Johnson returned to his home, which was located adjacent to the victims’ residence.
The City of Westlake objected to the sentence modification, citing Marsy’s Law violations and arguing against removal of the distance restriction. On September 11, 2025, the victims’ Ring camera captured footage of Johnson being driven past their residence twice. The City then filed a complaint alleging Johnson violated the terms of his community control. The trial court found a violation and reimposed the 500-foot restriction, precluding Johnson from occupying his own residence.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s community-control violation finding. The court held that the City failed to establish that Johnson had any actual “contact” with the victims as defined in the no-contact order. The order’s definition of “contact” includes phone calls, emails, texts, social media, communications by any means directly or through another person—but did not include mere spatial proximity. Simply being driven past the victims’ residence, without more, does not constitute contact under the order.
The court noted a critical temporal issue: on September 11, 2025, when the alleged violations occurred, the 500-foot distance requirement had been removed by the August 29 order and had not yet been reimposed (it was only reimposed on September 24). Therefore, the only active prohibition was the “no-contact” order itself. Additionally, the court emphasized that there was no evidence the victims were actually present outside their home when Johnson was driven past—they only learned of the incidents through their doorbell camera. The probation officer’s uncontested testimony established that Johnson had no direct contact with the victims.
Key Takeaways
- A “no-contact” order requires proof of actual contact as specifically defined in the order—mere proximity does not constitute a violation.
- Community-control violations must be proven by substantial evidence; the State is not required to meet the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.
- When a trial court modifies the terms of probation by removing restrictions (such as a distance requirement), those removed terms are no longer enforceable until reimposed.
- Unintentional proximity caused by third parties (e.g., ride-share drivers) does not support a community-control violation absent evidence of knowing contact or violation.
Why It Matters
This decision provides important protection for defendants subject to no-contact orders by requiring courts to enforce the specific terms of those orders as written and to distinguish between prohibited types of contact and mere spatial proximity. The ruling prevents incarceration for technical or inadvertent proximity violations when the defendant has made no actual contact with the victim. It also underscores the importance of the temporal dimension in probation enforcement: when a court removes a restriction, that removal is effective until the court reimposed it, and violations must be measured against the restrictions actually in effect on the date of the alleged violation.
The decision reinforces that community-control sanctions must be enforced with precision and substantial evidence. Trial courts cannot expand the definition of “contact” to punish mere presence or proximity, particularly where the defendant did not control the circumstances (such as being a passenger in a vehicle) or was unaware of the victims’ location. For probationers living near their victims, this ruling clarifies that they may occupy their lawful residence without violating no-contact orders, provided they make no actual contact.