Background
Dustin Charles Komp pleaded guilty to misdemeanor driving under the influence of intoxicants under ORS 813.010(4). The trial court imposed the general conditions of probation, including the statutory condition directing him, when state and federal law conflict, to obey state law.
Komp challenged that condition under the federal Supremacy Clause, although he had not objected when the court stated at sentencing that the general probation conditions would apply. He also challenged a provision in the written judgment requiring him to pay any required per diem fees, an obligation that the court had not addressed orally at the plea and sentencing hearing.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed the probation condition. Applying State v. McClintock-Perez, it held that preservation was not excused because the trial court announced that the general probation conditions would apply and Komp did not object. The court also declined plain-error relief because it was not obvious—and was reasonably disputable—that the condition violated the Supremacy Clause.
The court accepted the state’s concession that including per diem fees in the written judgment was plain error because those fees had not been addressed at the hearing. It therefore remanded for resentencing and otherwise affirmed.
Key Takeaways
- A defendant must timely object when a sentencing court announces that the general conditions of probation will apply; the later appearance of a specific general condition in the judgment does not necessarily excuse preservation.
- The court found no plain error because whether the state-law-first probation condition violates the Supremacy Clause remains reasonably disputable.
- A written judgment may not impose per diem fees that the court did not announce at the plea and sentencing hearing, and that error ordinarily requires resentencing.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces Oregon preservation rules for challenges to standard probation conditions and confirms that the statutory direction to obey state law when state and federal law conflict is not plainly unconstitutional under existing Court of Appeals authority.
It also underscores that financial obligations must be pronounced at sentencing before they are included in the written judgment. The opinion is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion under ORAP 10.30 and may be cited only as that rule permits.