State v. Lillian — Remanded for resentencing because per diem fees were added only in the judgment

Background

Regan Lillian pleaded guilty to driving while suspended or revoked in Polk County Circuit Court. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court did not address fines, fees, or other monetary obligations.

The written judgment nevertheless ordered Lillian to “pay any required per diem fees.” She appealed that provision, arguing that the court could not impose the fees for the first time in the judgment. The state conceded the error and agreed that the per diem-fee term could not stand.

The Court’s Holding

The Oregon Court of Appeals accepted the state’s concession that the trial court erred by including per diem fees in the judgment when those fees had not been announced at sentencing. Under the court’s prior decisions, adding an unannounced fee to a written judgment is reversible error.

The court rejected the parties’ proposed remedy of simply directing entry of a corrected judgment deleting the provision. Because the sentencing record was silent about fees—and the trial court had not expressly waived them—the court retained permissible sentencing options concerning those fees. The Court of Appeals therefore remanded for resentencing and otherwise affirmed the judgment.

Key Takeaways

• A trial court may not impose per diem fees for the first time in a written criminal judgment when the fees were not addressed at sentencing.
• When the sentencing record is silent about discretionary fees, the appropriate remedy is resentencing because the trial court may still permissibly impose them on remand.
• Merely correcting the judgment is appropriate when the trial court expressly waived fines and fees, leaving no permissible sentencing choice to revisit.

Why It Matters

The decision distinguishes between a written judgment that conflicts with an announced waiver and one that adds a term to a silent sentencing record. That distinction determines whether an appellate court will order a ministerial correction or a full resentencing.

The opinion is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion under ORAP 10.30 and may be cited only as that rule permits.