Background
Tyler Almon Winn was convicted in Multnomah County Circuit Court of one count of second-degree assault under ORS 163.175 and one count of fourth-degree assault under ORS 163.160. On appeal, Winn’s sole argument was that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on “less-satisfactory evidence”—specifically, UCrJI 1030.1. This instruction permits jurors to view the state’s weaker evidence with suspicion if stronger and more satisfactory evidence was reasonably available to the prosecution but not presented.
The Court’s Holding
The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed Winn’s convictions. The court rejected Winn’s argument that ORS 10.095(7) and (8) automatically entitle a defendant to the less-satisfactory evidence instruction whenever the record shows other evidence was reasonably available to the state and that evidence was stronger.
The court relied on its prior decision in State v. Wildeboer, 338 Or App 404, 566 P3d 1149 (2025), which established that the presumption in ORS 10.095(8) does not apply when the state failed to gather superior evidence for a legitimate reason unrelated to suppressing unfavorable evidence. Additionally, the court noted that Wildeboer concluded UCrJI 1030 itself “was not legally correct,” making any refusal to give it proper.
Key Takeaways
- Trial courts do not err in refusing to give UCrJI 1030, the less-satisfactory evidence instruction.
- A defendant is not automatically entitled to the instruction merely because stronger evidence was available to the prosecution; the state’s reason for not gathering or presenting it matters.
- Wildeboer precedent controls: the instruction applies only when the state’s failure to produce superior evidence is motivated by a desire to suppress unfavorable evidence, not for legitimate evidentiary reasons.
Why It Matters
This decision protects prosecutorial discretion in evidence gathering and presentation. By conditioning the less-satisfactory evidence instruction on the state’s motive—rather than simply whether stronger evidence existed—the court prevents defendants from using the instruction to second-guess prosecutorial judgment or to invite juries to speculate about evidence the state chose not to develop. Oregon prosecutors retain significant latitude in deciding which evidence to pursue and present, provided that choice is not driven by a desire to conceal exculpatory information.
For defendants, the ruling narrows a potential avenue for undermining the state’s case at trial. The burden remains on the defendant to show not merely that stronger evidence was available, but that the state’s omission reflected improper motive rather than legitimate case-building decisions.