Background
A Pennsylvania State Police trooper was prosecuted for driving under the influence after an investigation that included chemical testing of his blood. He moved to suppress, challenging the encounter and contending that his consent to the blood draw was not voluntary. He also claimed selective prosecution because the district attorney arranged testing by a second laboratory and allegedly treated him differently because he was a police officer.
The suppression record showed that the investigating trooper read the DL-26B warnings. Those warnings advised that the defendant could refuse testing and explained the consequences. He then agreed to provide blood. The record did not identify threats or other coercive conduct tied to that consent.
After conviction, the defendant renewed the suppression and selective-prosecution issues on appeal, along with other challenges addressed in the lengthy memorandum.
The Court’s Holding
In a nonprecedential memorandum by Judge Lazarus, the Superior Court affirmed. Having concluded that the encounter leading to consent was lawful, the court assessed voluntariness under the totality of the circumstances. Reading the DL-26B form gave the defendant a knowing choice between consent and refusal, and the record contained no indicia of coercion. The inability to consult counsel or invoke silence before deciding did not invalidate consent because the warnings correctly explain that those rights do not govern the chemical-test request.
The selective-prosecution claim also failed. A claimant must identify similarly situated people who were not prosecuted and show that the discriminatory selection rested on an impermissible ground such as race, religion, exercise of a constitutional right, or another arbitrary classification.
The defendant identified no comparable unprosecuted individuals. Nor did he establish that employment as a law-enforcement officer is a protected or arbitrary classification for this purpose. The second laboratory test, without the required comparative and discriminatory proof, did not establish selective prosecution.
Key Takeaways
- Voluntary consent to DUI chemical testing is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances.
- Reading the DL-26B warnings supports a knowing choice because the form explains refusal and its consequences.
- A selective-prosecution claim requires evidence of similarly situated people who were not prosecuted.
- Different investigative treatment alone does not establish discrimination on an impermissible basis.
Why It Matters
The decision provides a useful suppression record checklist. The Commonwealth should establish the exact warnings, the defendant’s response, and the absence of coercive circumstances. Defense counsel must identify facts beyond the inherent pressure of a DUI investigation.
Selective-prosecution theories need comparative evidence early. Showing unusual scrutiny is not enough without suitable comparators and proof that the selection rested on a constitutionally impermissible or arbitrary classification.