Background
Barry Wayne Jones was convicted of murder following his killing of Milledge “B’Boy” Hall outside the Johnston Pool Room in Edgefield County. The case grew from escalating tensions over how the bar was run and a personal dispute over rumors that Jones had been fired from his job at the Savannah River Site. On the evening of May 7, 2018, after Decedent slapped the rear fender of Jones’s car as he was leaving the parking lot, Jones drove home, packed a bag of guns and ammunition, and sent a text to a friend reading “I’m gonna kill that BBoy.” Seventeen minutes after sending that message, Jones returned to the pool room parking lot.
After a ten-minute standoff, during which Jones claimed Decedent brandished a gun — a claim contradicted by multiple witnesses and surveillance footage — Jones exited his vehicle and shot Decedent twice. Decedent died; no gun was found on or near him. Jones then fled, engaged Sheriff’s Deputy Captain James Florida in a shootout on a rural road, and self-inflicted a gunshot wound to his neck and chin. While in custody he stated, “I tried to kill myself and I couldn’t even do that.” He was indicted for murder and the attempted murder of Captain Florida. The circuit court denied Jones’s pretrial immunity motion under the Protection of Persons and Property Act (the Act), S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-410 to -450. After a seven-day trial, the jury convicted Jones of murder but acquitted him of the attempted murder charge, and the circuit court sentenced him to thirty-five years.
Jones appealed, arguing (1) the circuit court erred in denying Stand Your Ground immunity; (2) evidence of his suicide attempt should have been excluded; and (3) the self-defense jury instruction was inadequately tailored to his theory of the case.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge McDonald joined by Judges Konduros and Vinson, affirmed on all three grounds.
On Stand Your Ground immunity, the court applied the four-element self-defense framework that must be satisfied before immunity attaches. The Act — South Carolina’s codification of the Castle Doctrine — removes the duty to retreat but does not eliminate the other elements of self-defense, including the requirement that the defendant be “without fault in bringing on the difficulty.” See State v. Curry, 406 S.C. 364 (2013). Jones’s decision to return to the Pool Room heavily armed only seventeen minutes after texting his intent to kill Decedent defeated any claim that he bore no fault, the court held. Even setting that aside, Jones’s self-serving testimony was the only evidence of imminent danger: surveillance video and multiple witnesses contradicted his claim that Decedent displayed a weapon, no gun was recovered, and the video showed Decedent was not close enough to forcibly enter or remove Jones from his car when Jones chose to exit and fire. The court rejected Jones’s fallback argument that Decedent’s approach triggered the occupied-vehicle provision of § 16-11-440(A), emphasizing that courts need not accept an accused’s version of the facts at an immunity hearing. State v. Oates, 421 S.C. 1 (Ct. App. 2017).
On the suicide attempt evidence, the court applied State v. Cartwright, 425 S.C. 81 (2018), which requires the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) a jury could reasonably find the attempt occurred; (2) the defendant was aware of the charged offense at the time; and (3) an unmistakable nexus links the attempt to a guilty conscience from that specific offense. Jones conceded the first two elements. The court found the third element satisfied by the totality of Jones’s post-crime conduct: he had no prior indication of suicidal ideation, he had armed himself before returning to the Pool Room, and the unbroken sequence — homicide, flight, shootout with police, self-inflicted wound, statement “I tried to kill myself and I couldn’t even do that” — provided the requisite nexus. Jones’s argument that the police encounter on Log Creek Road constituted a “break in the causal chain” was rejected; there was no evidence of suicidal ideation before the killings.
On the jury charge, Jones had requested verbatim language from State v. Rash, 182 S.C. 42 (1936), and State v. Starnes, 340 S.C. 312 (2000), instructing that a defendant “doesn’t have to wait until his assailant gets the drop on him.” The circuit court declined the verbatim request and instead gave a charge covering: the right to act on appearances, that the law does not hold a defendant to a “refined assessment of the danger,” and that a defendant may even be mistaken. The appellate court found no error, holding that courts need charge only the substance of the law, not the defendant’s preferred language. Because the video evidence showed Decedent was not charging, had no weapon drawn, and was not endangering anyone when Jones exited his vehicle to fire, the evidence did not support a preemptive-strike instruction.
Key Takeaways
- South Carolina’s Protection of Persons and Property Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-440, requires a valid self-defense claim including the “without fault” element. Returning to a confrontation site while armed — and minutes after texting a stated intent to kill — can defeat this element regardless of the decedent’s prior threats or physical imposing presence.
- Trial courts may reject an accused’s version of events at a Stand Your Ground immunity hearing when surveillance footage and multiple witnesses directly contradict it. The standard is preponderance of the evidence, and credibility is in play.
- Under Cartwright, suicide attempt evidence survives Rule 403 scrutiny when the defendant’s own post-crime conduct and statements establish an unmistakable nexus to guilty conscience. A temporal gap of under an hour between the charged offense and the self-harm does not, by itself, sever the causal chain.
- A self-defense jury charge need not track requested verbatim language from older cases; the court must cover the substance of the law, including the right to act on appearances and the relaxed standard for assessing danger in the moment.
Why It Matters
State v. Barry W. Jones provides a detailed account of how South Carolina courts apply the Protection of Persons and Property Act when the defendant’s pre-confrontation conduct cuts against him. The opinion’s treatment of the “without fault” element is especially instructive: the court looked beyond the immediate encounter and examined Jones’s deliberate choices in the minutes before the shooting — arming himself and expressing explicit homicidal intent — to conclude he had not proven the first element by a preponderance. Defense counsel handling pretrial immunity motions should audit every client communication and action in the lead-up to the use of force, as courts will review the entire sequence in evaluating fault.
The Cartwright analysis reinforces the existing framework for suicide attempt evidence in South Carolina criminal trials. Prosecutors need not produce a confession of guilt; the nexus requirement is satisfied when the chain of post-crime events points, without a plausible alternative explanation, to a guilty conscience. Practitioners on both sides should note that the court treated the absence of prior suicidal ideation as affirmative evidence supporting the nexus — a factor that may tip the analysis even in cases where the connection is otherwise close.