Background
On July 5, 2019, Braylon Morris shot Jason Deck twice inside a Greer Walmart—once in the stomach and again point-blank in the head after Deck had fallen. Surveillance video captured the shooting and was introduced at trial. Witnesses described Deck as approaching Morris with his hands visible and empty, and one witness said Deck appeared to be in an apologetic posture. Morris testified he feared Deck because of prior text messages he interpreted as death threats and because Deck was known to him as someone dangerous. Two days before the shooting, Morris had texted Deck “death before dishonor” and “you know where I'm at.” After arresting Morris in a nearby parking lot, an investigator asked Morris about the murder weapon; Morris responded he had “gone about it the wrong way” and assured the investigator the gun would not be found by children.
At trial, Morris sought a self-defense jury instruction with “continuing to shoot” language—specifically, that if he was justified in firing the first shot, he was also justified in continuing to fire until the danger had completely ended. He also sought a defense-of-others instruction based on his claim that he acted to protect his girlfriend and her son. The trial court removed the “continuing to shoot” language and refused the defense-of-others instruction. Over objection, the State also introduced a jail email Morris sent while awaiting trial in which he stated “the confidential informant is still alive—if you want to help, you know what can be done.” Morris was convicted of murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime and sentenced to life without parole for murder plus five consecutive years on the weapon charge.
The Court’s Holding
Affirmed in part and vacated in part. A panel of Chief Judge Williams, Judge Konduros, and Judge Vinson affirmed the murder conviction and sentence but vacated the five-year sentence on the weapon charge as illegal.
On the self-defense jury charge: the court found no reversible error in removing the “continuing to shoot” language. Under State v. Marin, 415 S.C. 475, 783 S.E.2d 808 (2016), the absence of that specific language does not mandate reversal when the charge given otherwise adequately covers the elements of self-defense. Here, the trial court instructed the jury that Morris had “the right to act on appearances” even if mistaken and could use as much force as “a person of ordinary reason and firmness would have believed to be needed to prevent death or serious bodily injury.” That charge adequately encompassed the right to use deadly force. The evidence also supported the removal: Deck was on the floor and motionless after the first shot, visibly unarmed, and plainly presented no further threat. Retaining “continuing to shoot” language on those facts would have been misleading.
On the defense-of-others charge: a trial court must give a defense-of-others instruction only when there is evidence that the defendant was lawfully defending a third party who would have had the right to use force in self-defense. Here, the surveillance video showed that Deck did not approach or threaten Morris’s girlfriend or her son; Deck was backing away from Morris; and Morris’s own statement to Victim’s father at the bond hearing—“that’s why he’s dead” (because he introduced Morris to an alleged police informant)—demonstrated that the shooting was personal, not protective.
On the jail email: the email was relevant because the record showed Morris believed Victim and Pope were confidential informants, Victim had introduced Morris to Pope, and Morris consequently killed Victim. The email referencing “the confidential informant is still alive—if you want to help, you know what can be done” was thus probative of motive and identity, and the trial court’s ruling adequately reflected awareness of the Rule 403 balancing test. On the weapon-charge sentence: both parties agreed the five-year add-on was illegal. Section 16-23-490(A) of the South Carolina Code expressly provides that the five-year enhancement “does not apply in cases where . . . a life sentence without parole is imposed for the violent crime.” Under State v. Plumer, 439 S.C. 346, 887 S.E.2d 134 (2023), an illegal sentence may be corrected on direct appeal even if the defendant did not object at sentencing.
Key Takeaways
- A self-defense jury charge that covers the right to use deadly force as reasonably necessary adequately encompasses the right to continue shooting; omission of explicit “continuing to shoot” language is not reversible error when the given charge is otherwise complete, particularly where the evidence shows the threat had ended after the first shot.
- A defense-of-others instruction requires evidence that the third party the defendant claims to have protected was in actual imminent danger from the victim; where the victim was backing away and unarmed, and the defendant’s own statements attributed the killing to personal grievance rather than protection of others, the instruction is properly refused.
- Section 16-23-490(A)’s five-year add-on for weapon possession during a violent crime does not apply—and is illegal—when the defendant receives life without parole on the underlying charge; the sentence may be vacated on direct appeal under State v. Plumer (2023) even without a trial-level objection.
- Jail communications referencing potential future harm to living persons connected to the prosecution are admissible as relevant to motive and identity when the defendant’s motive for the charged killing is at issue.
Why It Matters
The weapon-add-on issue is the most immediately practical point in Morris for South Carolina criminal practitioners. The statutory bar in § 16-23-490(A) is easy to overlook at sentencing—especially in cases that generate intense courtroom pressure—but its effect is dramatic: a sentence that stacks five years on top of LWOP is illegal on its face. Under Plumer, that illegality can be raised on direct appeal without a prior objection, meaning defense counsel who catch the issue post-trial are not foreclosed. Prosecutors who request the add-on in LWOP cases should independently flag the statutory bar before the sentencing court enters judgment.
The self-defense and defense-of-others holdings are fact-bound but illustrate two important South Carolina principles: “continuing to shoot” language is available but not required, and defense-of-others instructions hinge on evidence that the third party faced imminent danger from the victim—not on the defendant’s subjective belief that protecting others was his motive. Counsel preparing self-defense cases should ensure the record contains specific evidence on each element before pressing for instructions the court may be reluctant to give.