Background
On July 27, 2024, Travarius Dewayne Houston entered a gas station market early in the morning, allegedly intoxicated. After claiming his wallet and phone had been stolen, he took a beer from the cooler and drank it without paying. When police arrived, he initially provided a false name but later produced identification showing his correct name was Travarius Houston. During the arrest, the defendant allegedly spit on Officer Christopher Cantrell on two separate occasions and made statements that could be construed as threatening harm to the officer. He also placed his foot in the patrol car door to prevent closure while being placed in the vehicle.
The trial court convicted Houston of two counts of assault on a law enforcement officer, one count of retaliation for past action, one count of theft of merchandise, and one count of resisting arrest. He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, suspended to one year of probation. Houston appealed on grounds of insufficient evidence and prosecutorial misconduct.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Houston’s conviction on the first assault count, finding insufficient evidence that he acted “knowingly” when spitting on the officer. The court’s video analysis showed Houston was yelling continuously at a bystander without deliberately collecting spittle in his mouth; the spit came out inadvertently as he yelled. Critically, there was no evidence Houston was aware that his yelling was “reasonably certain” to cause the offensive contact. The court affirmed the second assault conviction, however, because after Officer Cantrell told Houston “you’re still spitting on me,” Houston continued yelling and thereby continued to spit with knowledge of the contact.
The court also reversed the retaliation conviction. Under Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-16-510, the offense requires that the defendant threaten harm “in retaliation for anything the witness did in an official capacity as witness.” The statute protects participants in official proceedings—judicial, legislative, administrative, or executive proceedings. An arrest is not an official proceeding under this definition; therefore, the statute did not apply to Houston’s statements made during his arrest. The court affirmed convictions for the remaining assault count, theft, and resisting arrest. As to resisting arrest, the court found sufficient evidence when Houston extended his foot to block the patrol car door during the arrest process.
Key Takeaways
- Assault by spitting requires knowledge that the conduct is “reasonably certain” to cause offensive contact; inadvertent spittle from yelling at a bystander does not meet this standard.
- Once a defendant is made aware that their conduct is causing offensive contact (spittle landing on an officer), continued conduct constitutes knowing assault.
- Tennessee’s retaliation statute applies only to threats made in connection with official proceedings (judicial, legislative, administrative, or executive); conduct during an arrest does not fall within this definition.
- Physical obstruction of an arrest—such as placing one’s foot in a car door—constitutes resisting arrest.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the mental state required for assault by spitting on a law enforcement officer. Prosecutors cannot rely on involuntary bodily contact resulting from yelling or other non-deliberate conduct; they must show the defendant was aware that the contact was reasonably certain to occur. This distinction protects defendants from overreach while preserving accountability once knowledge of the harmful contact is established.
The reversal of the retaliation conviction also defines the jurisdictional scope of Tennessee’s witness-retaliation statute. By limiting it to official proceedings, the court signals that threatening statements made during an arrest—however inappropriate—do not fall within the statute’s protective ambit. This may encourage prosecutors to charge threats in other contexts or to enhance charges differently, while narrowing the statute’s application in the police encounter context.