Background
Gabriel Joshua Alonzo was convicted by a jury of second-degree burglary of a habitation. With the punishment range enhanced by two prior final felony convictions, the trial court sentenced him to 40 years in prison. Alonzo and Rayna Molina had previously dated, and Alonzo sometimes stayed at her home, but both agreed that he was not named on the lease. Molina testified that they had broken up before the charged incident and that Alonzo no longer had permission to enter her residence.
On January 17, 2025, Molina saw Alonzo on her security camera banging on and kicking her front door. She called police, and Alonzo shattered a bedroom window before breaking through the door. Molina testified that he grabbed her, shook her, and shoved her toward a table. He then took the cellphone she had been using to speak with a 911 dispatcher, placed it in his hoodie pocket, and fled. The State introduced Molina’s 911 call and home-security footage. Alonzo challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on criminal trespass.
The Court’s Holding
The Seventh Court of Appeals held that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the burglary conviction. Although Alonzo presented evidence connecting him to the address, including a phone bill, an appliance agreement, and his prior possession of a key, the jury could rationally find that Molina had the greater right to possess the home when the offense occurred. Her testimony that Alonzo did not live there, was not on the lease, and was not permitted inside after their breakup sufficiently established the absence of effective consent.
The court also held that the jury could find that Alonzo assaulted Molina and intended to deprive her of her cellphone. Molina testified that being grabbed, shaken, and shoved caused pain, and she could be heard saying “ow” during the 911 call; visible injury was unnecessary because any physical pain could constitute bodily injury. Alonzo took the phone while Molina was contacting emergency services, fled with it, kept it for several days, and initially lied to police about its location. His eventual return of the phone did not preclude the jury from finding the required intent when he took it.
Finally, the court held that Alonzo was not entitled to a criminal-trespass instruction. Criminal trespass requires intrusion of the defendant’s entire body, while burglary may be committed through intrusion by any part of the body or an object connected to it. Because the indictment alleged only that Alonzo “entered” the habitation and did not allege full-body entry, proof of criminal trespass was not included within proof of the charged burglary. Alonzo therefore failed the first step of the lesser-included-offense analysis, and the court did not need to reach whether the evidence permitted a finding that he committed only trespass.
Key Takeaways
- A person may commit burglary despite previously staying at a residence if, at the time of entry, another person has the greater right to possession and has withdrawn consent.
- Physical pain alone can establish bodily injury for assault; visible injuries are not required.
- Criminal trespass is not a lesser-included offense of burglary when the indictment alleges entry without specifying intrusion of the defendant’s entire body.
Why It Matters
The decision emphasizes that possessory rights and consent in a burglary prosecution are evaluated at the time of the alleged offense, making prior access or connections to an address noncontrolling. It also illustrates that temporary retention of property can support an inference of intent to deprive when the surrounding conduct and circumstances permit that conclusion.
For jury-charge practice, the opinion reinforces the importance of the indictment’s wording. A defendant seeking a criminal-trespass instruction in a burglary case may need to challenge an indictment that does not specify full-body entry; without that allegation, criminal trespass does not satisfy the first requirement for treatment as a lesser-included offense.