Background
At approximately 9:00 p.m. on December 9, 2024, Rockbridge County Sheriff’s Lieutenant Chris Young followed a truck driven by Robert McCumber. Young observed McCumber traveling five miles per hour below the posted 35 mph speed limit, weaving twice within the travel lane with a slow drift followed by an abrupt jerk back, and driving without his taillights illuminated. Young stopped the truck. Upon approach, he detected alcohol on McCumber’s breath; McCumber admitted consuming two “tall” beers, failed a field-sobriety test, and registered a blood-alcohol level of 0.12%.
McCumber moved to suppress all evidence, arguing the stop violated the Fourth Amendment because two intra-lane weaves were insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of DWI. He also argued the stop was tainted by Virginia Code § 46.2-1030(F), which prohibits law-enforcement officers from stopping a vehicle “for a violation of” the statute’s nighttime illumination requirements and renders evidence obtained from such stops inadmissible. The Rockbridge County Circuit Court denied the motion without written explanation. McCumber entered a conditional guilty plea to DWI under Code § 18.2-266, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling, and was sentenced to 60 days’ incarceration (all suspended) plus one year of probation, a one-year license suspension, and completion of an alcohol-safety program.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals considered two issues: whether the totality of circumstances established reasonable suspicion for the stop, and whether the statutory exclusionary rule in Code § 46.2-1030(F) barred use of the evidence because taillights were among the factors Young observed.
The Court’s Holding
Writing for the majority, Judge Raphael held that the totality of circumstances gave Young reasonable suspicion to believe McCumber was driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The court rejected McCumber’s argument that a minimum number of intra-lane weaves is required, emphasizing that Freeman v. Commonwealth and Neal v. Commonwealth established no such bright-line rule — the standard is reasonableness under all the circumstances. Here, McCumber’s two abrupt swerves on a flat, straight roadway at night, combined with driving below the speed limit and operating without taillights, collectively warranted the stop. The court credited Young’s 11 years of experience and “couple hundred” traffic stops as part of the calculus, and rejected McCumber’s proffered innocent explanations by noting that reasonable suspicion does not require ruling out innocent conduct.
On the statutory question, the court agreed with McCumber — and rejected the Commonwealth’s position — that Code § 46.2-1030(F)’s exclusionary rule applies to taillight violations, because taillights are “illuminating devices” covered by subsection (A)’s sunset-to-sunrise requirement. Nevertheless, the court held the rule did not apply on these facts because Young did not stop McCumber “for a violation of” the taillight statute. Young’s stated reason for the stop was suspected DWI under Code § 18.2-266. The unlit taillights were simply one factor among several that, in combination, created reasonable suspicion of intoxicated driving — not a pretext for a stop based on the equipment violation itself.
Judge Causey concurred in the taillight-coverage holding but dissented from the judgment on two grounds: she would have held that Code § 46.2-1030(F) bars unlit taillights from serving as any part — not merely the sole basis — of the reasonable-suspicion calculation, and she would have found two brief intra-lane swerves on a short flat stretch insufficient, standing alone, to support reasonable suspicion of DWI.
Key Takeaways
- Virginia courts apply a strict totality-of-the-circumstances test for DWI reasonable suspicion; there is no minimum number of intra-lane weaves required — the character, context, and combination of driving behaviors control.
- Code § 46.2-1030(F)’s statutory exclusionary rule extends to non-illuminated taillights (not only headlights), but the rule is triggered only when the stop is made “for” that violation — not when the taillight observation is one factor among others supporting suspicion of a separate crime such as DWI.
- An officer’s training and years of experience remain relevant and may be credited by the trial court in evaluating whether observed driving behavior establishes reasonable suspicion.
- Innocent alternative explanations for a defendant’s driving do not defeat reasonable suspicion; the purpose of a Terry stop is to resolve that very ambiguity.
- Judge Causey’s dissent signals a potential future issue: whether § 46.2-1030(F) bars unlit taillights from contributing in any necessary way to a mixed-motive stop, even when DWI is the primary stated basis.
Why It Matters
This published opinion is the first Virginia appellate decision to squarely hold that Code § 46.2-1030(F) — part of the General Assembly’s 2020 package of statutes designed to curb pretextual traffic stops for minor equipment violations — covers taillights as well as headlights. Defense counsel in Virginia can now point to a binding published precedent for that coverage. At the same time, the majority’s ruling makes clear that the statute does not surgically excise taillight observations from a DWI reasonable-suspicion analysis when the officer’s stated basis for the stop is impaired driving; the observation remains usable as circumstantial evidence of intoxication so long as it is not the stop’s legal predicate.
The dissent’s statutory-interpretation argument — drawing on causation principles from employment and housing discrimination law to urge that “for a violation” bars the factor from any necessary role in the reasonable-suspicion calculus — is a well-developed theory that could be urged before the Supreme Court of Virginia or pressed in the legislature. Practitioners handling pretextual-stop suppression motions under the 2020 secondary-offense statutes should monitor whether this split draws further review.