Perkins v. Commonwealth of Virginia — Affirmed convictions for first-degree murder and gang participation based on real-time direction through Instagram

Case
Anthony Elijah Perkins v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Court
Court of Appeals of Virginia
Date Decided
March 31, 2026
Docket No.
0323-25-4
Topics
Criminal liability, Gang participation, Social media evidence, Constructive presence

Background

Anthony Elijah Perkins, a member of the 9 Trey Gangster Bloods, recruited two young men, Antoine Geter and TreSean Keene, at a cookout in spring 2021, telling them they would need to “put in work” for the gang to join. Perkins issued a standing directive to Geter to kill rival gang members when ordered. On May 15, 2022, after Keene posted party photos on Instagram showing Malik Davis, Perkins messaged them inquiring whether Davis was affiliated with a rival Crip gang. Perkins directed them to “keep eyes on” Davis and said he would let them know “when” he wanted them to “do it” because he wanted to be present.

Without waiting for Perkins to arrive, Geter and Keene executed their plan. Geter obtained Davis’s gun by requesting to borrow it for a picture, shot Davis’s friend Christian Roberts in the head, then fired on Davis. Keene emerged from the bathroom and continued firing. As they fled, Geter returned and “finished the job.” Geter was arrested four days later but initially withheld information about Perkins’s involvement, fearing retaliation. After months of investigation, Perkins was indicted approximately 18 months after the murders.

At trial, Geter and Keene admitted firing the fatal shots and testified that Perkins directed them through direct communication and death threats. The jury convicted Perkins of two counts of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and criminal gang participation. He was sentenced to 70 years incarceration (10 years suspended).

The Court’s Holding

The Court of Appeals affirmed all convictions. The court held that the jury instructions on both principal in the second degree and accessory before the fact correctly stated Virginia law and were supported by more than a scintilla of evidence. Critically, the court applied the doctrine of “constructive presence”—holding that Perkins need not be physically at the crime scene if he directed the common enterprise. Perkins’s initial directive at the cookout, identification of the target, kill order, and real-time Instagram coordination (including “liking” a message from Keene at 2:41 a.m., hours before the murders) demonstrated that he remained an “active, constructively present participant in the enterprise until the moment the shooters acted.”

As to Christian Roberts, whom Perkins did not know was present, the court applied the “concert of action” doctrine, holding that Perkins could not escape liability based on lack of intent. Roberts’s death was a foreseeable consequence of Perkins’s scheme to kill an armed man in a room with other armed people. The court emphasized that “each co-actor is responsible for the acts of the others, and may not interpose his personal lack of intent as a defense.”

The conspiracy conviction was supported by evidence of an agreement between Perkins and the shooters. Perkins’s assertion that he told them to wait for his order rather than act immediately was irrelevant—”the amount of incitement or encouragement to commit the crime is irrelevant if the encouragement in fact induces the principal to commit the offense.” The criminal gang participation conviction followed necessarily, as Perkins directed the murders for the benefit of the Bloods gang.

Key Takeaways

  • Constructive presence doctrine: A defendant can be liable as a principal in the second degree even without physical presence at the crime scene if he directed the common enterprise through planning, coordination, and real-time control.
  • Social media evidence: Real-time coordination through Instagram or other platforms, including “liking” messages and issuing directives, can establish the requisite criminal intent and ongoing participation in the criminal enterprise.
  • Gang leadership liability: Leaders who recruit gang members and issue directives to “put in work” (commit violent acts) can be held liable for murders carried out by those members, even if the specific operational details differ from the leader’s instructions.
  • Concert of action doctrine: Accomplices are liable for foreseeable consequences of the common design even if they did not contemplate or direct those specific consequences.

Why It Matters

This decision provides important guidance on how Virginia courts analyze criminal liability in the digital age, particularly for gang-related prosecutions. It clarifies that direct physical presence is not required for principal-in-the-second-degree liability when a defendant maintains real-time control over criminal activity through social media or other remote means. The court’s analysis of Perkins’s Instagram activity—including messaging, directives, and engagement with killers hours before the murders—establishes that prosecutors can use digital communications to prove constructive presence and shared criminal intent.

The decision has significant implications for gang prosecutions. Perkins’s “standing kill directive” and language requiring recruits to “put in work” for gang benefits created a framework through which real-time coordination could be prosecuted as ongoing leadership. Defense arguments that operational details differed from the leader’s explicit instructions, or that the leader did not contemplate every victim, will not shield gang leaders from liability under the concert of action doctrine. The holding suggests Virginia courts will readily infer criminal conspiracy and gang participation from gang recruitment, initiation language, and coordinated social media activity.

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