Background
In April 1993, a jury convicted Terry L. Buxton of first-degree murder in the death of his former wife and malicious wounding of the man with whom she was having a relationship. The jury declined to recommend mercy. The circuit court sentenced Buxton to life imprisonment without mercy on the murder conviction and two to ten years on the malicious-wounding conviction, with the sentences running consecutively.
In Buxton’s first habeas proceeding, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing in December 2013 at which he raised ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After relief was denied, the Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed in Buxton v. Ballard, No. 14-0648, 2015 WL 2364510 (W. Va. May 15, 2015) (memorandum decision). That decision rejected the trial-counsel claim and described Buxton as having been uncooperative during trial, including filing his own motions and refusing to recognize the possibility of a first-degree murder conviction.
Buxton then initiated this second habeas proceeding. The circuit court appointed counsel and held an evidentiary hearing at which Buxton, his daughter, and prior habeas counsel testified. In its March 26, 2024, order, the court held that all issues except ineffective assistance of habeas counsel were barred by res judicata because they had been fully litigated or could have been raised with reasonable diligence in the earlier proceeding. It credited habeas counsel’s testimony that she and co-counsel provided effective assistance and alternatively found that Buxton had not shown how any deficiency would warrant relief.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of habeas relief in a memorandum decision under West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 21(c), finding no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. The Court stated the applicable standards: the circuit court’s order and ultimate disposition are reviewed for abuse of discretion, underlying factual findings for clear error, and questions of law de novo, citing Syllabus Point 1 of Mathena v. Haines, 219 W. Va. 417, 633 S.E.2d 771 (2006).
The Court concluded that Buxton had not met his appellate burden of demonstrating error and found none in the circuit court’s rulings. It therefore held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief. The Court also declined to disturb the circuit court’s rejection of Buxton’s assertion that he had not understood the prior warning that fully litigated or waived claims would be “forever barred,” noting his response that he understood and the rule that appellate courts do not decide witness credibility or weigh evidence.
The Court further determined that the circuit court made sufficient findings under Syllabus Point 1 of State ex rel. Watson v. Hill, 200 W. Va. 201, 488 S.E.2d 476 (1997), through its rulings on res judicata, counsel’s performance, and the absence of grounds for relief even assuming deficient performance. To the extent Buxton argued that the circuit court lacked a complete record, effectively alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in the instant habeas proceeding, the Court declined to address that issue. It cited Watts v. Ballard, 238 W. Va. 730, 798 S.E.2d 856 (2017), for the preferred procedure of raising ineffective assistance of habeas counsel in a subsequent petition filed in the court below.
Key Takeaways
- The Court affirmed the denial of Buxton’s second habeas petition and found no abuse of discretion.
- Claims other than ineffective assistance of prior habeas counsel were barred by res judicata under the circuit court’s findings.
- The ineffective-assistance claim failed on the circuit court’s credibility-based performance finding and, alternatively, because Buxton did not show how any deficiency would warrant relief.
- The Court declined to address a new ineffective-assistance allegation concerning counsel in the current habeas proceeding, identifying a subsequent petition below as the preferred route.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the distinct standards governing habeas appeals in West Virginia: de novo review of legal questions, clear-error review of factual findings, and abuse-of-discretion review of the ultimate disposition. It also underscores the appellant’s burden to demonstrate error and the deference owed to credibility determinations made after an evidentiary hearing.
For successive habeas litigation, the opinion reinforces the preclusive effect of claims previously litigated or available through reasonable diligence. Its refusal to consider the new current-counsel allegation was circumstance-specific and procedural, not a universal bar; the Court pointed to a subsequent habeas petition as the preferred method for presenting that claim.