State v. Blasel — conviction upheld; new-trial order reversed

Case
State of Wisconsin v. Daniel A. Blasel
Court
Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District IV
Judge
Per curiam (appointment info not available)
Date Decided
August 6, 2026
Docket No.
2025AP708-CR
Topics
Ineffective assistance, child sexual assault, jury unanimity, privileged records
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

A Wood County jury convicted Daniel A. Blasel of first-degree sexual assault of a child. The State’s principal evidence was the child victim’s 2020 recorded forensic interview, in which she described Blasel forcing her to engage in oral sex during the winter of her second-grade year. The recording also included her allegations that Blasel’s adult son had separately assaulted her in similar ways.

Blasel’s trial counsel did not seek to exclude the son-related portion of the interview. Counsel instead used the similarities between the allegations against father and son—including that each allegedly flicked his tongue before an assault—to argue that the child’s account was implausible. After conviction, the postconviction court found counsel ineffective for allowing the jury to hear the allegations against the son and ordered a new trial. The State appealed; Blasel cross-appealed on other grounds.

The Court’s Holding

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the new-trial order and affirmed the conviction. It held that counsel’s decision to permit the entire forensic interview was a reasonable credibility-defense strategy, not deficient performance under Strickland. Counsel could reasonably conclude that the parallel allegations against Blasel and his son would cause jurors to doubt the child’s account or to question whether Blasel, rather than his son, was the perpetrator.

The court also concluded that Blasel had not shown prejudice. The allegations against the son did not directly prove any element of the charge against Blasel, and the jury was instructed not to decide the case based on sympathy, prejudice, or passion. The court rejected Blasel’s alternative ineffective-assistance claims because he did not establish that an other-acts objection would have succeeded, and because the record identified only one described act of sexual intercourse supporting the charged count. It further held that any possible error in excluding the child’s healthcare records was harmless.

Key Takeaways

  • A defense strategy may be constitutionally reasonable even if it carries risk and does not expressly accuse a third party.
  • A defendant alleging ineffective assistance for failure to object must show that the omitted objection had merit.
  • A unanimity instruction was unnecessary where only one described act could constitute the charged sexual-intercourse offense.

Why It Matters

The decision underscores the substantial deference appellate courts give to trial counsel’s strategic choices. In child-sexual-assault cases, counsel may reasonably use similarities in allegations involving different alleged perpetrators to challenge credibility, even where the evidence could also generate sympathy for the victim.

The ruling also illustrates the limits of postconviction relief based on evidentiary claims: a defendant must establish both a legally meritorious objection and resulting prejudice, while exclusion of potentially useful evidence will not warrant a new trial when the asserted error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

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