Background
Wisconsin charged Jordan Ramone Hawkins in February 2019. He initially requested a speedy trial, but withdrew his statutory demand in April so counsel could review extensive digital discovery and Hawkins could address a revocation proceeding. His first scheduled trial date was later removed at his request after the State filed a separate robbery case and made a new plea offer.
Trial ultimately began on February 6, 2023—1,449 days after the complaint was filed. The intervening delays included pandemic-related jury-trial suspensions, Hawkins’ requests for new counsel and continuances, a late-filed suppression motion, replacement counsel’s need to prepare, and a final 147-day postponement caused by court congestion. A jury convicted Hawkins of fleeing an officer, felon in possession of a firearm, resisting an officer, and obstructing an officer, all as a repeater.
The Court’s Holding
The court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the nearly four-year delay did not violate Hawkins’ constitutional right to a speedy trial under the four-factor test of Barker v. Wingo. Although the delay was long enough to require constitutional scrutiny, most of it resulted from defense-related requests, ordinary case administration, or the COVID-19 public-health emergency.
Only the final 147 days, caused by court congestion, weighed against the State, and only slightly. Hawkins’ repeated assertions of the speedy-trial right favored him, but were moderated by his own requests for preparation time, new counsel, and continuances. He showed some anxiety and a lost opportunity for concurrent sentencing, but no impairment of his defense; the sentencing court also mitigated the lost-concurrency concern by giving him some credit for it.
Key Takeaways
- A long delay alone does not establish a speedy-trial violation; courts balance all Barker factors under the totality of the circumstances.
- Pandemic jury-trial closures may be attributable to the State in identifying the cause of delay but need not weigh against it when they are a reasonable response to a public emergency.
- Defense requests for continuances, replacement counsel, and time to litigate a late suppression motion generally are not charged to the State.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the limited weight given to neutral court-congestion delay when most of the pretrial period is attributable to defense-related events or a justified pandemic closure. It also underscores that a defendant alleging a delay under five to six years ordinarily must identify concrete prejudice, particularly impairment of the defense.