Background
Damarion M. Pollard was charged in Dane County with attempted first-degree intentional homicide as a party to a crime, possession of a firearm by a felon, and two counts of felony bail jumping, arising from a shooting in which the victim was struck by a handgun bullet. The circuit court initially set cash bail at $100,000, citing Pollard’s missed court appearances in other cases and his status as an absconder from Department of Corrections supervision.
After Pollard demanded a speedy trial under Wis. Stat. § 971.10, the court set a March 27, 2023 trial date. The State obtained a continuance because two key police witnesses were on administrative leave and a key detective would be out of the country; the State also had not produced about 500 pages of discovery. The court found that the ends of justice supported the continuance, reduced Pollard’s cash bond to $50,000, and later set trial for August 7. Pollard sought release on a signature bond and dismissal with prejudice, arguing that the State’s failure to try him within 90 days required those remedies. The court denied both requests, and a jury convicted Pollard on all counts.
The Court’s Holding
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that § 971.10 does not require release from custody when a felony trial occurs more than 90 days after a speedy-trial demand if the circuit court properly grants an ends-of-justice continuance under § 971.10(3). The statutory remedy of discharge from custody applies only when a defendant is not tried “in accordance with” § 971.10 as a whole, which includes the statute’s continuance provision.
The court relied on the statute’s plain language and concluded that Pollard’s interpretation would render the continuance provision meaningless. It also cited State ex rel. Rabe v. Ferris for the proposition that a valid continuance under subsection (3) makes the release provision in subsection (4) inoperative. Pollard’s due-process argument failed because it rested on an incorrect reading of the statute, was undeveloped and unsupported by authority, and did not allege a violation of his constitutional speedy-trial right.
Key Takeaways
- A valid ends-of-justice continuance under Wis. Stat. § 971.10(3) permits trial beyond the statute’s initial 90-day period.
- The statutory release remedy does not automatically apply merely because trial begins more than 90 days after a speedy-trial demand.
- A defendant seeking pre-jeopardy dismissal with prejudice must establish a constitutional speedy-trial violation; an asserted statutory violation alone does not suffice.
Why It Matters
The decision confirms that Wisconsin’s speedy-trial statute must be read as an integrated scheme: the 90-day deadline is subject to properly supported continuances. Defense counsel challenging continued detention after a continuance must address whether the continuance findings were valid, rather than rely solely on expiration of the original 90-day period.
It also underscores that constitutional claims require developed argument and supporting authority, and that the statutory remedy for noncompliance is discharge from custody—not dismissal of the criminal charges.