United States v. Brown — Eighth Circuit Affirms 84-Month Sentence for Felon in Possession

Case
United States of America v. Courtney Antron Brown, Jr.
Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Judge
KELLY; BENTON; JUSTIN D. SMITH
Date Decided
November 6, 2026
Docket No.
25-2880
Topics
Criminal Law; Sentencing; Substantive Reasonableness; Felon in Possession
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Courtney Antron Brown, Jr. pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, Jefferson City, varied upward from a maximum guidelines sentence of 71 months and sentenced Brown to 84 months in prison. The district judge was the Honorable Roseann A. Ketchmark. Brown appealed, challenging the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.

Brown raised two arguments on appeal. First, he contended that the district court improperly varied upward based on criminal history that had already been accounted for by the sentencing guidelines. Second, he argued that the district court failed to properly account for mitigating factors in his history and characteristics, specifically his age, upbringing, and lack of education.

The Court’s Holding

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court reviewed the substantive reasonableness of the sentence for abuse of discretion, citing United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Under this standard, a district court abuses its discretion when it fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only the appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing them. The court emphasized that it will be the unusual case when a district court sentence is reversed as substantively unreasonable, whether the sentence falls within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range.

Regarding the criminal-history argument, the court held that the district court properly applied the § 3553(a) factors and concluded that Brown’s criminal history justified the upward variance. The district court focused on Brown’s adult criminal activity and noted that, despite his youth, he had an extensive criminal history involving violence and needed to be deterred from further criminal conduct. The court relied on United States v. Ivory, 146 F.4th 693, 698 (8th Cir. 2025), which establishes that factors taken into account in calculating the advisory guidelines range can form the basis of an upward variance, including criminal history already accounted for by the Guidelines. The court found no abuse of discretion.

As to the mitigating factors, the court noted that at Brown’s request, the district court heard testimony from Brown’s mother about his childhood. The district court specifically cited that testimony and Brown’s age as mitigating factors when it declined to adopt the government’s request for a 96-month sentence and instead imposed an 84-month sentence. The district court explained: “I believe this is a seven-year sentence. And I want to reduce that 96-month term by one year, again, based on the positive aspects his mother talked to the Court about and in light of Mr. Brown’s very young age.” The court cited United States v. Johnson, 151 F.4th 978, 985 (8th Cir. 2025), for the proposition that mere disagreement with how the district court weighed the relevant sentencing factors does not justify reversal. The district court found the testimony from Brown’s mother and his age compelling and noted that as part of the sentencing colloquy. The court concluded that it was not a clear error of judgment for the district court to weigh these factors differently than Brown would have preferred.

Key Takeaways

  • A district court may vary upward based on criminal history already accounted for by the Guidelines without abusing its discretion.
  • When a district court hears mitigation evidence and expressly cites it in fashioning a sentence below the government’s request, an appellate court will not second-guess the weight assigned to those factors.
  • Reversal for substantive unreasonableness remains the unusual case, even for above-Guidelines sentences.

Why It Matters

This unpublished per curiam decision reinforces the broad discretion district courts exercise in sentencing, particularly when varying upward from the Guidelines range. It confirms that criminal history factored into the Guidelines calculation can still support an upward variance, and that a district court’s express consideration of mitigating evidence—coupled with a sentence below the government’s recommendation—will generally withstand appellate scrutiny for substantive reasonableness.

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