Background
Enyinna Onyewu, Emmanuel Sumo, and Quaysa Flumo were tried jointly for a series of ten robberies committed in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia during January 2018. A jury convicted all three of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery. Flumo and Sumo were also convicted of two completed Hobbs Act robberies and two counts of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The district court sentenced Onyewu to 166 months, Flumo to 234 months, and Sumo to 204 months in prison.
On appeal, the defendants challenged evidence concerning a later Missouri traffic stop and evidence recovered from Onyewu’s car. Flumo and Sumo disputed whether completed Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a Section 924(c) crime of violence. Onyewu raised a due-process challenge to a plea offer conditioned on his codefendants’ acceptance of their offers. Flumo separately challenged evidence from his phone, a photograph showing him holding a handgun, opinion testimony about that photograph, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his Section 924(c) convictions. The defendants also raised ineffective-assistance claims for the first time on appeal.
The Court’s Holding
In a per curiam opinion, the D.C. Circuit affirmed all convictions. It held that evidence from the Missouri traffic stop was admissible for the non-propensity purpose of showing the defendants’ criminal association and survived Rule 403 balancing. The seizure of Onyewu’s car was lawful under the automobile exception because the car was operable and police had probable cause based on its proximity to a home invasion and its registration to Onyewu. A mistaken description of the car’s precise location in the warrant affidavit did not warrant a Franks hearing because the error was immaterial and there was no evidence of an intentional or reckless falsehood.
The court held that the Hobbs Act is divisible into separate robbery and extortion offenses, making the modified categorical approach applicable to identify the offense of conviction. Expressly assuming that Hobbs Act robbery is not further divisible, the court concluded that completed Hobbs Act robbery categorically requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force and therefore qualifies as a crime of violence under Section 924(c). The court also rejected Onyewu’s plea-wiring claim because he did not show that the government acted in bad faith to coerce a guilty plea.
As to Flumo, the court held that evidence from his phone was admissible under inevitable discovery and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the handgun photograph. It concluded that FBI Agent Kaori Tahan’s firearm testimony rested on professional experience and therefore was improperly admitted as lay opinion rather than expert testimony, but found the error harmless given the other evidence. The evidence also sufficiently established Flumo’s participation in the relevant robberies and his advance knowledge that a confederate would use a firearm. Finally, the court rejected the ineffective-assistance claims without remand because the trial record conclusively showed no colorable claim of prejudice; it treated several additional, skeletal claims as forfeited.
Key Takeaways
- The Hobbs Act is divisible into robbery and extortion offenses; the court assumed, rather than held, that Hobbs Act robbery is not further divisible.
- Completed Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a Section 924(c) crime of violence because its force, violence, or fear-of-injury alternatives necessarily involve physical force.
- Professionally derived firearm-identification testimony falls under Rule 702, not Rule 701, although the misclassification here was harmless.
- Judge Wilkins and Judge Walker filed separate concurrences addressing the historical understanding of common-law robbery and the court’s earlier decision in United States v. Burwell. Judge Wilkins defended Burwell’s conclusion that common-law robbery could encompass obtaining property through a threat to accuse the victim of sodomy, while Judge Walker expressed reluctance to extend Burwell beyond its controlling holding.
Why It Matters
The decision brings the D.C. Circuit into agreement with the other federal courts of appeals that have addressed whether completed Hobbs Act robbery is a Section 924(c) crime of violence. Its divisibility analysis is precise: the court separated Hobbs Act robbery from Hobbs Act extortion but did not hold that robbery itself contains further divisible offenses.
The opinion also gives practitioners guidance on several recurring criminal-procedure and evidence issues, including later-act evidence offered to prove conspiratorial association, vehicle seizures under the automobile exception, the threshold for a Franks hearing, inevitable discovery of digital evidence, and the boundary between lay and expert opinion testimony.