Background
Garrick Richardson had twice been convicted under District of Columbia law of carrying a pistol outside the home without a license. For his 2022 conviction, the D.C. Superior Court suspended a sentence of imprisonment and supervised release and instead imposed one year of supervised probation.
While still on probation, Richardson knowingly possessed a firearm and was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal felon-in-possession statute. He moved to dismiss the indictment on facial and as-applied Second Amendment grounds. After the district court denied the motion, Richardson entered a conditional guilty plea and received 40 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release.
The Court’s Holding
The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Applying the text-and-history framework associated with New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, the court assumed without deciding that its pre-Bruen precedent did not resolve the case and that Richardson’s conduct fell within the Second Amendment’s text. It nevertheless held that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to felons who remain under supervision as part of a criminal sentence when they possess a firearm.
The court found a widespread Founding-era tradition of temporarily disarming convicted felons while they served their sentences, including through imprisonment, property or firearm forfeitures, and forms of noncustodial supervision. Because probation is part of a criminal sentence, the court concluded that disarming Richardson during probation imposed a historically supported burden. It did not decide whether § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime prohibition is constitutional after a felon completes all sentences. Because the statute was constitutional in at least this category of applications, Richardson’s facial challenge also failed.
Key Takeaways
- Section 922(g)(1) may constitutionally be applied to a felon who possesses a firearm while serving probation, parole, supervised release, or another form of criminal supervision.
- The historical justification does not depend on an individualized finding of dangerousness; Founding-era disarmament extended to people convicted of violent and nonviolent offenses.
- The decision leaves unresolved whether lifetime disarmament remains constitutional after a person has completed every component of the relevant criminal sentences.
Why It Matters
The ruling establishes a narrow but significant basis for rejecting Second Amendment challenges to felon-in-possession prosecutions in the D.C. Circuit: a defendant who was still serving a sentence when the firearm offense occurred may be disarmed consistently with historical tradition. By declining to decide the broader validity of lifetime felon disarmament, the court preserved the possibility of future as-applied challenges by people who have fully completed their sentences.