Disposition
The Florida Sixth District Court of Appeal affirmed the order under review in Earl Butler’s appeal from the Circuit Court for Highlands County. The court issued a per curiam decision consisting of the single disposition “AFFIRMED,” followed by a supporting citation. It did not publish a narrative account of the underlying proceedings, identify the particular order being affirmed, or separately discuss any individual argument presented on appeal.
The appeal was brought pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2). The lower tribunal number is 2012-CF-000971, and the opinion identifies David V. Ward as the circuit judge. Butler appeared pro se and was listed in Perry. The State was represented by Attorney General James Uthmeier of Tallahassee and Chief Assistant Attorney General Cerese Crawford Taylor of Tampa.
Background
The public decision supplies only limited procedural information. It identifies Butler as the appellant and the State of Florida as the appellee, and it states that the case reached the district court through an appeal under Rule 9.141(b)(2) from the Highlands County circuit court. The opinion does not describe the underlying conviction, sentence, motion, evidentiary record, or circuit court ruling. Those matters therefore cannot be supplied from this document.
The appellate court’s citation to Maye v. State, 436 So. 3d 416, 418 (Fla. 2026), identifies the legal context of the decision: the use of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) to raise a claim of error under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny. The citation includes a subsequent history entry noting that rehearing was denied in Maye, No. SC2023-1184, 2026 WL 2243835 (Fla. Aug. 4, 2026). The Butler opinion itself does not set out the facts of Maye or explain how that decision applies to any particular feature of Butler’s case.
The Court’s Holding
The court affirmed and cited Maye as authority. In the quoted parenthetical accompanying that citation, Maye states that Rule 3.800(a) is not the proper vehicle for raising a claim of error under Apprendi and its progeny. That is the only substantive rationale appearing in the public Butler decision. The court did not announce a broader rule concerning every possible postconviction claim, nor did it separately address the merits of an Apprendi challenge.
Because the decision contains no findings about Butler’s filing or the circuit court’s analysis, it should not be read as a published determination of any additional factual or procedural issue. The opinion does not, for example, specify a limitations ruling, a successive-motion ruling, or an independent factual basis for affirmance. Its express disposition is affirmance, with the Maye citation addressing the Rule 3.800(a) vehicle for the identified category of claim.
The decision states “PER CURIAM.” The concurrence line identifies Traver, C.J., and Kamoutsas and Pratt, JJ., as concurring. No separate opinion, dissent, or additional explanation is included.
Key Takeaways
- The Sixth District affirmed in Case No. 6D2026-1881, arising from Lower Tribunal No. 2012-CF-000971 in Highlands County.
- The sole published supporting citation is Maye v. State, concerning Rule 3.800(a) and claims of error under Apprendi and its progeny.
- The opinion does not describe Butler’s underlying criminal case, the challenged circuit court order, or the arguments in his appellate filings.
- No broader factual finding, claim-specific merits analysis, or additional procedural ground for affirmance appears in the public decision.
Why It Matters
This disposition provides a concise application of the authority cited in Maye in a pro se appeal under Rule 9.141(b)(2). Attorneys reviewing it can identify the outcome and the procedural-vehicle principle quoted from Maye, but the opinion does not provide enough information to assess how that principle interacted with the particulars of Butler’s filing.
The decision also carries the notation that it is not final until the time expires to file a motion for rehearing and, if such a motion is timely filed, until its disposition. That notation concerns finality; it does not alter the stated affirmance or add reasoning beyond the published citation.