Background
Jimmy Lee Fuller was convicted by a Saginaw Circuit Court jury of six counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(2)(b), and one count of accosting a child for an immoral purpose, MCL 750.145a. The victim was 11 years old when Fuller, then 38, began living in a camper on her family’s property in July 2020. The two communicated via Snapchat, and the relationship progressed to multiple sexual encounters in 2021. After the victim’s mother learned of the relationship in August 2021, police were notified. Fuller was arrested on November 7, 2021, and held without bond because of a 2002 guilty-plea conviction of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-II), MCL 750.520c(1)(a), in Alcona County.
Fuller’s trial did not begin until January 9, 2024—approximately 26 months after his arrest. The delay stemmed from multiple sources: Fuller’s initial failure to complete paperwork for appointed counsel; an unexplained adjournment of a December 2021 preliminary exam; a faulty electronic case management system that failed to notify the prosecution of a January 2023 trial date; pretrial motion practice regarding other-acts evidence; and Fuller’s decision to discharge his attorney in September 2023, necessitating appointment of new counsel. At trial, the prosecution introduced Snapchat messages the victim testified she exchanged with Fuller, as well as evidence of his 2002 CSC-II conviction under MCL 768.27a. The jury convicted on all counts. The trial court sentenced Fuller to concurrent terms of life imprisonment without parole (LWOP) for each CSC-I conviction under MCL 750.520b(2)(c), and 29 to 48 months for the accosting conviction, with credit for 842 days served.
The Court’s Holding
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. Writing for the panel, Judge Lievense first addressed Fuller’s speedy-trial claim under the United States and Michigan Constitutions. Applying the four-factor test from Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514 (1972), the court found the 26-month delay presumptively prejudicial, shifting the burden to the prosecution to prove lack of prejudice. However, the court attributed specific periods of delay to Fuller (his failure to complete counsel paperwork and his discharge of counsel), to the prosecution only minimally (an unexplained 42-day delay), and to neither party (the 356-day delay caused by the court’s faulty electronic docket system and delays inherent in pretrial motion practice). The court noted that Fuller complained of delay but did not file a formal speedy-trial motion until October 2023, and that he was willing to delay trial further in September 2023 to obtain new counsel. Balancing these factors, the court held the prosecution overcame the presumption of prejudice and no constitutional violation occurred.
Regarding evidentiary challenges, the court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 2002 CSC-II conviction under MCL 768.27a. Although the trial court did not explicitly mention People v. Watkins, 491 Mich 450 (2012), it elicited information addressing relevant factors, including the temporal gap (mitigated by Fuller’s 12-year incarceration), the ages of the victims, and the similar living arrangements. The court also held the Snapchat messages were properly authenticated under MRE 901(a) based on the victim’s testimony that they accurately depicted messages she exchanged with Fuller, combined with the content of the messages themselves. The court emphasized that conflicting evidence regarding genuineness goes to weight, not admissibility, and that the jury remained the ultimate fact-finder.
Finally, the court rejected Fuller’s constitutional challenges to his mandatory LWOP sentences. It held that People v. Parks, 510 Mich 225 (2022), and People v. Taylor, ___ Mich ___ (2025), which prohibit mandatory LWOP for offenders who were 18, 19, or 20 years old at the time of their offenses, did not apply because Fuller was in his late 30s when he committed the CSC-I offenses. The court noted it was bound by its prior holding in People v. Brown, 294 Mich App 377 (2011), that MCL 750.520b(2)(c) is facially constitutional, and disagreed that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Fuller. The court also rejected Fuller’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment challenge, holding that under Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 US 224 (1998), and People v. McCuller, 479 Mich 672 (2007), the fact of a prior conviction—including the victim’s age, which was already established in the prior judgment—need not be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Key Takeaways
- A 26-month pretrial delay is presumptively prejudicial, but the prosecution may overcome the presumption where delays are attributable to the defendant, court-system failures, or neutral case-management issues rather than prosecutorial misconduct.
- Evidence of a prior CSC conviction is admissible for propensity purposes under MCL 768.27a in CSC prosecutions involving minors, subject to MRE 403 balancing; a 20-year gap may be mitigated by intervening incarceration.
- Snapchat messages may be authenticated through testimony of the recipient combined with message content, without requiring forensic extraction from the sender’s device.
- Mandatory LWOP under MCL 750.520b(2)(c) does not violate the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment when the sentencing offense was committed in adulthood, even if the qualifying prior offense occurred when the defendant was a late adolescent.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the application of Barker v. Wingo to complex pretrial delays involving court-system failures and defendant-initiated adjournments, emphasizing that not all delays weigh against the prosecution. It also reinforces the broad admissibility of prior CSC convictions under MCL 768.27a and the relatively low threshold for authenticating social-media evidence under MRE 901. Finally, the court’s refusal to extend Parks and Taylor to sentence enhancements based on prior offenses committed during late adolescence preserves the viability of mandatory LWOP for repeat CSC offenders whose triggering offenses occurred in adulthood.
Affirmed.
/s/ Andrew J. Lievense
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi