Background
Garrett Rottau was convicted after a jury trial of four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and received four consecutive eight-year sentences, totaling 32 years. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. He later filed a postconviction petition alleging several instances of ineffective assistance by trial counsel. Because the circuit court did not act on the initial petition within the statutory 90-day period, it advanced to second-stage proceedings.
In his amended petition, Rottau alleged that counsel mishandled a 2014 plea offer under which the State would dismiss the four Class X charges in exchange for an open guilty plea to one Class 1 felony. According to Rottau, counsel told him the offer was “basically the same as the Class X charges,” did not explain its significance, and said he could plead guilty until trial. Rottau claimed he rejected the offer based on that advice. The circuit court dismissed the amended petition at the second stage, and Rottau appealed only the plea-related ineffective-assistance claim.
The record also documented a separate 2012 offer to plead guilty to one Class X count in exchange for dismissal of the other three counts. At a pretrial conference, the prosecutor and defense counsel stated that Rottau had rejected that offer, and Rottau confirmed the rejection. The court then warned him that convictions on all four counts would require consecutive sentences totaling between 24 and 120 years, served at 85%, and Rottau said he understood. In 2014, Rottau was present when the prosecutor stated that another offer—allegedly involving a Class 1 felony—had been withdrawn.
The Court’s Holding
The appellate court affirmed the second-stage dismissal because Rottau failed to make a substantial showing that counsel’s alleged advice prejudiced him. To establish prejudice in the plea-bargaining context, he had to provide independent, objective confirmation of a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s deficient advice, he would have accepted the plea offer.
The court found little objective support for Rottau’s assertion that he would have accepted the 2014 offer. The record showed that he knew an offer existed, was present when it was withdrawn, and had previously been told about the potentially severe consequences of convictions on all four charges. It also showed that he consistently maintained his innocence, testified at trial denying the allegations, offered an alternative explanation for physical evidence, and continued asserting innocence in his initial postconviction petition.
Because those circumstances did not support a reasonable probability that Rottau would have pleaded guilty if advised differently, the court held that he failed to establish Strickland prejudice. It therefore did not decide whether counsel’s alleged characterization of the offer constituted deficient performance.
Key Takeaways
- A second-stage postconviction petitioner must plead facts that, if proved, would establish both deficient performance and prejudice.
- A defendant claiming that bad legal advice caused rejection of a plea offer must provide independent, objective confirmation that he would otherwise have accepted it.
- Rottau’s repeated assertions of innocence and trial position undermined his later claim that different advice would have led him to plead guilty.
Why It Matters
The order illustrates the evidentiary burden facing defendants who challenge counsel’s plea advice in postconviction proceedings. A defendant’s later statement that he would have accepted an offer may be insufficient when the surrounding record—including prior plea proceedings and continued claims of innocence—does not objectively support that assertion.
The decision is an unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedential except in the limited circumstances permitted by Rule 23(e)(1).