Background
Thomas Cangemi was convicted in New York in 1994 of public lewdness for conduct occurring in 1993. After moving to Colorado, he registered as a sex offender based on that out-of-state conviction. In 2017, he pleaded guilty in Jefferson County, Colorado, to indecent exposure—masturbation. After he completed probation, the Jefferson County court relieved him of the registration requirement tied to the 2017 conviction.
In 2025, Cangemi petitioned in Adams County to discontinue his registration obligation stemming from the New York conviction. The People objected, arguing that the 2017 indecent-exposure conviction was a subsequent conviction for unlawful sexual behavior and therefore made him ineligible for deregistration. The district court granted the petition, citing the later case’s outcome and the fact that Cangemi could have sought deregistration before 2017.
The Court’s Holding
The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the plain language of section 16-22-113 bars a person from petitioning for, and bars a court from granting, deregistration when the person has subsequently been convicted of unlawful sexual behavior or another offense whose factual basis involved such behavior.
Cangemi’s 2017 conviction for indecent exposure qualified as unlawful sexual behavior under Colorado law and occurred after the 1993 offense for which he sought to deregister. Thus, regardless of the later court’s decision to end registration for the 2017 conviction, Cangemi was ineligible to seek deregistration for the New York conviction. The court remanded with directions to deny his petition.
Key Takeaways
- A subsequent conviction for unlawful sexual behavior is a statutory bar to deregistration under section 16-22-113.
- The bar applies even if the later conviction no longer independently requires registration.
- Courts must apply the statute’s plain language; fairness concerns about its effect are for the legislature absent a constitutional issue.
Why It Matters
The decision treats the statutory phrase “has not subsequently been convicted” as categorical. A later qualifying sex-offense conviction prevents deregistration for an earlier offense, even where the petitioner otherwise would have met the waiting-period requirement and even if the later registration obligation has ended.
For practitioners, the opinion underscores the importance of reviewing a client’s full adult conviction history before pursuing deregistration. It also confirms that trial courts may not create equitable exceptions based on timing, rehabilitation, or perceived inconsistency between registration orders.