Background
On February 20, 2019, the Livingston Grand Jury indicted Jackie Clinton Doom on three counts of murder. On May 13, 2019, the Commonwealth entered a notice of aggravating circumstances and indicated its intent to seek the death penalty. In August 2020, Doom and the Commonwealth reached a plea agreement under which Doom would plead guilty to the three murder charges and the Commonwealth would recommend three concurrent life imprisonment sentences for each count, with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years. On September 21, 2020, Doom pleaded guilty, and the trial court sentenced him according to the agreement’s terms.
Approximately four and a half years later, on April 28, 2025, Doom filed a Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion. He claimed that depression and alcoholism had rendered him unable to enter a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. He also argued that he should be allowed to present an extreme emotional disturbance defense to the crimes and requested a hearing on his CR 60.02 motion. The Commonwealth responded on May 7, 2025, contending that the motion was untimely and procedurally barred because Doom had failed to file a Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.42 motion.
The Livingston Circuit Court denied the CR 60.02 motion on September 3, 2025. Doom, proceeding pro se on appeal, challenged that denial in the Kentucky Court of Appeals. The appeal came from Livingston Circuit Court Action No. 19-CR-00007, before the Honorable James R. Redd, III.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Writing for a panel on which all judges concurred, Judge Karem explained that denial of a CR 60.02 motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Under that standard, the question is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. The opinion emphasized that CR 60.02 supplies an extraordinary remedy, not an ordinary additional appeal, and that relief from a criminal judgment requires an extraordinary showing of a likely miscarriage of justice.
The court first agreed that Doom’s CR 60.02 motion was procedurally barred. Relying on the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decisions in Gross and McQueen, the opinion explained that CR 60.02 and RCr 11.42 are separate and distinct remedies in criminal cases. A defendant in custody under sentence must use RCr 11.42 for grounds of which the defendant is aware, or should be aware, while that remedy is available. CR 60.02 is not an additional opportunity to relitigate issues that reasonably could have been presented on direct appeal or in RCr 11.42 proceedings. Issues that could have been raised in an RCr 11.42 motion therefore cannot instead be raised through CR 60.02.
Applying that rule to Doom’s particular claims, the court stated that he could have raised them in an RCr 11.42 motion. He knew his state of mind when he entered his plea, knew of his depression and alcoholism at that time, and knew of his EED defense when he pleaded. The court found nothing “newly discovered” about this evidence and held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion on that basis.
The court independently held that Doom had not filed within a reasonable time. Reasonableness is committed to the trial court’s discretion. Doom waited more than four years after sentencing even though his complaints were known to him before he entered his plea. Citing Reyna v. Commonwealth, which found a four-year delay untimely, the court concluded that four years was not a reasonable time to wait before raising these claims and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely.
Key Takeaways
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the Livingston Circuit Court’s September 3, 2025 order denying Doom’s CR 60.02 motion.
- Doom’s plea-voluntariness and EED-related claims were procedurally barred from CR 60.02 because they were known when he pleaded and could have been raised in an RCr 11.42 motion.
- The court separately upheld denial because Doom waited more than four years after sentencing, which was not a reasonable time for these previously known claims.
- Both rulings were reviewed and affirmed under the abuse-of-discretion standard; the opinion did not announce a universal four-year deadline for every CR 60.02 motion.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the distinct functions of RCr 11.42 and CR 60.02 in Kentucky criminal cases. A defendant cannot use CR 60.02 as a substitute avenue for issues that could have been presented through RCr 11.42 while that remedy was available. Here, the court’s application turned on Doom’s knowledge of his mental state, depression, alcoholism, and EED defense when he entered his plea, not on a broader ruling concerning every possible post-conviction claim.
The opinion also shows that CR 60.02’s reasonable-time requirement is circumstance specific and reviewed for abuse of discretion. The court relied on the combination of Doom’s delay of more than four years and his pre-plea knowledge of the complaints. It did not address ineffective-assistance claims, specify an RCr 11.42 limitations period, or characterize the claims as forfeited; its holdings were procedural preclusion under CR 60.02 and untimeliness on these facts.