The First Department affirmed a $100-per-day contempt award after OMH left an incompetent defendant at Rikers for months beyond a court-ordered transfer deadline.
The Third Department held that prosecutors exercised due diligence under CPL article 245 despite discovering body-camera footage during trial, and affirmed the convictions.
The Third Department held that a without-prejudice dismissal at the first stage of a Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act resentencing request is not appealable.
The First Department exercised interest-of-justice discretion to send a 17-year-old’s weapon case to Family Court because prosecutors had not shown extraordinary circumstances overcoming Raise the Age’s removal presumption.
The Second Department held that CPL 420.45 may render a fraudulent deed void from inception after a false-filing conviction even when no signature was forged.
The Second Department held that release on bail pauses CPL 30.30(2)(a)’s 90-day custody clock and that later recommitment resumes, rather than resets, the count.
The Second Department upheld Suffolk County’s DWI vehicle-forfeiture law and found forfeiture of a $21,000 Nissan proportionate to a repeat felony DWI involving extreme speeding.
A divided Second Department restored a criminally negligent homicide count based on an 81-mph fatal crash in a 30-mph residential zone.
The First Department held that calculating incarceration tolling for predicate-felony status is ministerial and does not require a jury under Erlinger.
The First Department ordered a second resentencing because the judge denying youthful-offender treatment appeared unfamiliar with the defendant’s actual offense and personal circumstances.
The Second Department held that a court may reopen a SORA hearing before final disposition to correct its risk calculation, provided the offender had notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond.
The First Department reinstated an indictment after recalculating the CPL 30.30 clock at 97 days, excluding codefendant motion practice, reasonable preparation time, and defense-caused delay.
The Third Department held that DOCCS must honor a sentencing judge’s shock-incarceration order when the same judge imposes a concurrent sentence for a non-disqualifying offense.
The Third Department affirmed denial of DVSJA resentencing where the defendant’s claimed childhood abuse occurred in 2002–2003 but the murder was committed in 2007 — finding insufficient temporal nexus and that his own testimony undermined the causation element.
The Third Department reversed one of Rainey’s two terroristic-threat convictions — holding that a private Snapchat message he did not intend to circulate lacked the required intent to intimidate a civilian population — while affirming convictions for Whisper bomb-threat posts and emails threatening a TV news station.
Conviction reversed and new trial ordered: trial court required the People to give race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges — implicitly finding a prima facie Batson case — then erroneously denied the challenge at step 1 without proceeding to pretext analysis at step 3.
Appellate Division affirms dismissal of weapons indictment after finding the DA’s Certificate of Compliance was invalid — failure to disclose police memo books and property vouchers constituted a lack of due diligence under CPL 245, triggering a speedy-trial violation under CPL 30.30.
The Appellate Division, Second Department sustained a habeas writ for a defendant held more than 90 days without a valid certificate of compliance, finding the People’s supplemental CoC deficient because 60-plus automatic discovery items—including mandatory impeachment materials—remained outstanding at the time of filing.
The Third Department reverses and holds that a police officer who suffered psychological trauma from a station-house shooting is a “crime victim” under New York’s Son of Sam Law without needing to show physical injury, broadly construing Executive Law § 632-a.
The Appellate Division, First Department vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for a Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) eligibility hearing after the People conceded that conditioning her guilty plea on waiver of a Penal Law § 60.12 hearing was improper under People v. N.H.
The Appellate Division, First Department reversed a dismissal and reinstated a class action challenging the NYPD’s practice of routinely handcuffing all arrestees during arraignment without judicial approval, finding the policy states a viable due process claim under the New York State Constitution.
The Appellate Division, Second Department reverses a weapon possession conviction after finding that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to pursue a man who walked between two residential driveways, rendering the subsequent discovery of a discarded firearm the product of an unlawful seizure.
The Appellate Division, Second Department holds that CPLR Article 78 prohibition does not lie to challenge a criminal court’s evidence preclusion order under CPL 245.80(1)(a), even when the order would effectively prevent the prosecution from presenting its case.
The First Department modified a probation sentence, striking four conditions as not reasonably necessary under Penal Law § 65.10(1): a financial surcharge on an indigent defendant relying on public assistance, a dependent-support condition where the defendant had no dependents, an order-of-protection compliance condition with no supporting history, and a gang-paraphernalia ban with no evidence of any gang connection.