People v. Kemp — First Department strikes unsupported probation conditions
The First Department removed gang, substance-use, and psychiatric probation conditions that had no evidentiary relationship to the defendant’s offense or rehabilitation.
The First Department removed gang, substance-use, and psychiatric probation conditions that had no evidentiary relationship to the defendant’s offense or rehabilitation.
The Court of Appeals held that CPL 30.30(6) applies to appeals pending when the 2020 reform took effect, even where the guilty-plea conviction predated the statute.
The Court of Appeals held that CPL 30.30(6) preserves statutory speedy-trial review after a guilty plea but does not prevent a defendant from expressly waiving that review.
The Second Department reduced a SORA designation from level three to level two because prosecutors identified no aggravating factor omitted from the risk instrument.
The Second Department held that an attempted-murder defendant was not entitled to a DVSJA resentencing hearing because his submissions did not corroborate domestic abuse at the time of the offense.
The Second Department upheld seizure of a gun seen in plain view after a plate database inquiry on an illegally parked vehicle indicated the plates might be stolen.
The Court of Appeals held that postplea statements did not trigger the narrow Lopez preservation exception because the defendant never moved to withdraw or vacate her plea.
The Court of Appeals held that Penal Law justification may apply when prosecutors prove child endangerment through the defendant’s use of force and ordered a new trial.
The Fourth Department vacated a 17-year-old’s drug plea because prosecutors used nonspecific, unsupported allegations rather than sworn personal-knowledge facts to establish extraordinary circumstances.
The Fourth Department held that a father’s child-sex-offense convictions collaterally estopped him from relitigating the same abuse issues in pending Family Court article 10 proceedings.
The Fourth Department held that police had probable cause to arrest a knife-brandishing bar patron even though later-reviewed video showed the off-duty officer complainant initiated the fight.
After a second remand, the First Department held Bergdorf Goodman security remained private despite using NYPD forms, calling 911, and transferring a suspect to police.
The First Department held that Erlinger does not require juries to calculate incarceration periods used in New York persistent-violent-felony sentencing.
The Third Department remitted for a due-diligence inquiry after prosecutors omitted a defendant’s checkpoint statements from automatic discovery before certifying compliance.
The Third Department affirmed vacatur of a manslaughter conviction where local counsel kept secret a law clerk’s warning that the judge had prejudged the psychiatric defense.
The First Department affirmed a $100-per-day contempt award after OMH left an incompetent defendant at Rikers for months beyond a court-ordered transfer deadline.
The Third Department held that prosecutors exercised due diligence under CPL article 245 despite discovering body-camera footage during trial, and affirmed the convictions.
The Third Department held that a without-prejudice dismissal at the first stage of a Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act resentencing request is not appealable.
The First Department exercised interest-of-justice discretion to send a 17-year-old’s weapon case to Family Court because prosecutors had not shown extraordinary circumstances overcoming Raise the Age’s removal presumption.
The Second Department held that CPL 420.45 may render a fraudulent deed void from inception after a false-filing conviction even when no signature was forged.
The Second Department held that release on bail pauses CPL 30.30(2)(a)’s 90-day custody clock and that later recommitment resumes, rather than resets, the count.
The Second Department upheld Suffolk County’s DWI vehicle-forfeiture law and found forfeiture of a $21,000 Nissan proportionate to a repeat felony DWI involving extreme speeding.
A divided Second Department restored a criminally negligent homicide count based on an 81-mph fatal crash in a 30-mph residential zone.
The First Department held that calculating incarceration tolling for predicate-felony status is ministerial and does not require a jury under Erlinger.