Background
Duane Robert Snyder was charged with one count of fourth-degree assault constituting domestic violence following an alleged altercation with a person who shared his home. The state’s theory was that Snyder assaulted the complainant while telling her to leave; Snyder’s defense was that the complainant—who was on supervised probation for a prior domestic violence assault—fabricated the allegation and called 9-1-1 to exploit the system in her favor.
During trial, the prosecution questioned the arresting officer about his interaction with Snyder. In response, the officer testified that after he “Mirandized” Snyder, Snyder “invoked his rights.” Defense counsel immediately moved for a mistrial, arguing the state had deliberately elicited testimony about Snyder’s invocation of his right to remain silent. The trial court acknowledged the testimony was improper and expressed concern that it would suggest guilt to jurors, but offered a curative instruction instead of declaring a mistrial.
Defense counsel declined the curative instruction, reasoning it would only draw more attention to the prejudicial testimony. The trial court, having placed the practical burden on the defendant to accept or reject the instruction, ultimately denied the mistrial motion without taking any curative action. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and Snyder appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by doing nothing in response to the officer’s testimony about Snyder’s invocation of his Miranda rights. The court reaffirmed the rule from State v. Schumacher, 315 Or App 298 (2021): when a defendant moves for mistrial based on prosecutorial elicitation of evidence that the defendant invoked a constitutional right, and the trial court determines the jury is likely to infer guilt from that reference, it is the court—not the defendant—that must decide whether and how to cure the prejudice. The defendant’s refusal of a curative instruction does not excuse the trial court from acting.
The court rejected the state’s invited-error argument, finding that Snyder neither invited the improper testimony nor invited denial of his mistrial motion. The court emphasized that evaluating the propriety of the ruling requires examining the trial court’s decision, not the defendant’s tactical choices. Because the trial court itself found the testimony would “certainly suggest guilt” to a juror yet took no corrective action, that inaction constituted an abuse of discretion.
The court also offered broader guidance: given that curative instructions addressing invocation-of-rights testimony face an “perhaps impossible” task—they must negate the inference of guilt without either ignoring it (insufficient) or highlighting it (potentially more prejudicial)—trial courts confronting this scenario should understand that granting a mistrial is likely the only permissible exercise of discretion once the three key conditions are met: the defendant moves for mistrial, the motion is based on an impermissible invocation reference, and the court finds the jury is likely to infer guilt.
Key Takeaways
- When a prosecutor elicits testimony that a defendant invoked Miranda rights and the trial court finds the jury would likely infer guilt, the court must act — doing nothing is an abuse of discretion, even if the defendant declines a curative instruction.
- The responsibility to cure prejudice from improper invocation-of-rights testimony rests with the trial court, not the defendant; a defendant’s refusal of a curative instruction cannot constitute invited error for purposes of the mistrial ruling.
- Curative instructions in this context face a near-impossible standard: they must negate the guilt inference without either dismissively ignoring it (held insufficient in prior cases) or explicitly naming it (held to potentially worsen prejudice), making mistrial the practically safe choice once the triggering conditions are met.
- The court expressly called on prosecutors to prepare law enforcement witnesses to avoid volunteering invocation evidence, warning that failing to do so will predictably result in reversals and harmful delays for victims, defendants, and the justice system.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies a recurring and consequential tension in Oregon criminal trials: what must a trial court do when a police witness blurts out that a defendant “invoked” their rights? The court’s opinion synthesizes a line of cases into a practical framework, making clear that once the guilt-inference threshold is crossed and the defendant has moved for mistrial, the trial court has virtually no discretion to simply stand pat. Defense attorneys now have stronger grounds to demand a mistrial rather than accept a curative instruction that case law suggests will likely be found inadequate on appeal regardless.
For prosecutors and trial judges, the opinion is a direct warning: an ineffectual response to this type of improper testimony almost guarantees reversal, which harms everyone—including crime victims who must endure retrial. The court’s candid acknowledgment that mistrial, though “drastic,” is often the only legally sound remedy signals that Oregon appellate courts will continue scrutinizing these rulings closely and will not give trial courts a pass simply because the defendant rejected a curative fix.