Background
Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Deputy Anthony Machowski stopped Kent Austin Williams on Interstate 41 in a construction zone after observing Williams’s silver Cadillac traveling at approximately 80 miles per hour in a posted 55-mile-per-hour zone — 25 to 29 mph over the limit. Williams was issued a Wisconsin Uniform Citation referencing WIS. STAT. § 346.57(4)(h), which sets a 55-mph default speed limit in the absence of any other fixed or posted limits. Williams pleaded not guilty and proceeded to a bench trial, representing himself.
At trial, the County’s sole witness was Deputy Machowski, who testified that he paced Williams’s vehicle for over a mile using his squad car’s certified speedometer and determined Williams was traveling at no less than 80 mph. On cross-examination, Williams — acting as his own counsel — challenged the deputy’s pacing method, noting there were intervening vehicles between the squad car and the Cadillac, and questioned the consistency of speed estimates the deputy had reportedly called out on dash camera footage. Williams, however, chose not to testify and never moved to admit the dash camera footage into evidence. The circuit court found Williams guilty, crediting Machowski’s testimony and imposing the recommended fine.
On appeal, Williams raised two principal arguments: that the County failed to present sufficient evidence of a speeding violation under § 346.57(4)(h), and that the citation was so riddled with errors — including a wrong statutory designation and an incorrect notation in the minor passengers field — that it denied him adequate notice and the ability to prepare a defense.
The Court’s Holding
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a one-judge decision. On the sufficiency challenge, the court held that Machowski’s uncontradicted testimony — describing his pacing technique, his use of a department-maintained and certified speedometer, and his conservative estimate of Williams’s speed — constituted clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence of the violation. Because Williams neither testified nor admitted the dash camera footage into evidence, his unsworn courtroom commentary about inconsistent speed readings and the presence of intervening vehicles was not evidence the circuit court could consider. The appellate court found no basis to disturb the circuit court’s credibility determination.
The court also rejected Williams’s argument that § 346.57(4)(h) was inapplicable because the roadway had posted speed-limit signs. Williams’s only support for that claim was his own unsworn statements and the unadmitted dash camera footage. There was no record evidence establishing whether the highway had a posted limit; Machowski testified only that the zone was a 55-mph zone without specifying whether it was posted. Williams therefore could not demonstrate he had been charged under the wrong subsection. The court also noted that Williams himself appeared to concede the 55-mph limit was the applicable limit regardless of the statutory mechanism.
On the due process and citation-error arguments, the court held that Williams suffered no cognizable prejudice. Even assuming the citation referenced an imperfect statutory provision, it plainly described the offense — speeding 25 to 29 mph over a 55-mph limit — with enough specificity to allow Williams to understand and defend the charge. The unexplained “N” notation in the minor passengers field was not shown to have any legal significance to the offense or penalty, and Williams offered no authority for the proposition that such clerical errors undermine a conviction supported by otherwise credible testimony.
Key Takeaways
- A deputy’s pacing testimony, standing alone, can satisfy the “clear, satisfactory, and convincing” evidentiary standard for a traffic forfeiture conviction in Wisconsin — particularly where the defendant presents no sworn counter-evidence and does not challenge the speedometer’s reliability with actual proof.
- Unsworn statements made by a pro se defendant during cross-examination of a witness are not evidence; a defendant who declines to testify and fails to move exhibits into the record forfeits the right to rely on that material on appeal.
- A citation’s reference to the wrong or imperfect statutory subsection does not violate due process when the charging language itself gives sufficient notice of the nature of the offense and the defendant is not shown to have been prejudiced in preparing a defense.
- Failure to seek admission of evidence at trial — here, dash camera footage — forfeits any appellate claim that the court improperly excluded or ignored that evidence.
Why It Matters
For practitioners defending traffic and forfeiture matters in Wisconsin, the decision is a sharp reminder that procedural fundamentals — getting evidence admitted, electing to testify, and building a record — are just as critical in an informal small-claims traffic proceeding as in any other tribunal. The court’s willingness to affirm on a single officer’s pacing testimony, without calibration records, underscores that the burden falls on the defendant to introduce affirmative evidence of instrument defect or observation impairment, not merely to cast rhetorical doubt during cross-examination.
More broadly, the opinion illustrates the steep climb facing pro se appellants who rely on materials they never formally placed in the record. Courts will not consider arguments built on unadmitted exhibits or unsworn statements, and the failure to seek admission at trial is treated as a forfeiture of the issue on appeal — a lesson with implications well beyond traffic court.