Background
In March 2019, a large group gathered at a Florence quick stop to celebrate two birthdays. Measha Joyner and her sister, JoJo, became involved in physical altercations with two other women at the party. After the fights broke out, the host fired a shot into the air to disperse the crowd. Multiple witnesses testified that after being placed into the backseat of a departing car, Joyner extended her arm out the window and fired into the crowd as the vehicle left. A stray bullet struck bystander Chelsea Plowden in the head, killing her. One bystander, Jamares Robinson, drew a firearm and returned fire at the departing car. An eyewitness, Jamie Zimmerman, told police in the minutes after the shooting—captured on a trainee officer’s body camera—that she believed someone in the parking lot fired first and that Victim may have been caught in crossfire.
The jury acquitted Joyner of murder but convicted her of voluntary manslaughter and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. At the charge conference, Joyner had requested a self-defense instruction, arguing that Zimmerman’s statement provided evidence someone else fired first. The trial court declined to give the self-defense charge, offering a necessity charge instead. At sentencing, Joyner requested credit for approximately three years she had spent on monitored home detention while awaiting trial. The trial court sentenced her to twenty-five years for voluntary manslaughter and denied the home detention credit, noting the circumstances of the pretrial period, including a narcotics trafficking arrest (later dismissed) that occurred while Joyner was on home detention.
The Court’s Holding
A unanimous panel (Thomas, McDonald, and Turner, JJ.) affirmed on both issues.
On self-defense: South Carolina’s self-defense doctrine requires evidence supporting all four elements: (1) the defendant was without fault in bringing on the difficulty; (2) the defendant actually believed she was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury; (3) a reasonable person of ordinary firmness would have shared that belief; and (4) the defendant had no other means of avoiding the danger. State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491, 499 (2011). The court found Joyner failed to present sufficient evidence of at least one element. Most critically, multiple witnesses testified that no one was shooting at Joyner when she began firing from the backseat of the departing vehicle. The evidence showed Joyner was already in a moving car leaving the scene when she opened fire. Even the Zimmerman statement Joyner relied upon—describing a man who retrieved a gun from his car and fired in the direction of the exiting vehicle—reflected events occurring after Joyner began shooting. The court found no evidence Joyner was in imminent danger when she fired, or that a reasonable person of ordinary firmness would have believed so under these circumstances. The trial court properly declined to charge self-defense.
On home detention credit: Section 24-13-40 of the South Carolina Code draws a sharp distinction between time served in pretrial custody and time served on monitored house arrest. For pretrial custody, the statute provides courts “must” give full credit. For time spent on monitored house arrest, the statute provides courts “may” give credit—it is discretionary. The Court of Appeals found the trial court properly exercised that discretion in denying the credit. The trial court considered the monitoring company’s report showing no documented violations, but also considered the overall circumstances of Joyner’s pretrial supervision, including her arrest on narcotics trafficking charges (subsequently dismissed) while on home detention. The court found no abuse of discretion in denying the credit, even though the trafficking charge was ultimately dismissed.
Key Takeaways
- A self-defense instruction is warranted in South Carolina only when evidence supports all four required elements. Evidence that a defendant opened fire from a departing vehicle, and that no one was shooting at the defendant at that moment, fails the imminence and absence-of-means-to-avoid-danger elements. Body camera statements from bystanders do not automatically establish self-defense; they must affirmatively support each element.
- Under S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-40, credit for pretrial time in actual custody is mandatory; credit for time on monitored home detention is discretionary. A sentencing court may consider the totality of circumstances during the home detention period—including dismissed charges—when deciding whether to grant credit.
- The mandatory/discretionary distinction in § 24-13-40 means that even a defendant with a perfect compliance record on electronic monitoring has no right to sentence credit for that period. The credit requires affirmative judicial action.
Why It Matters
Joyner offers practical guidance on two issues that arise frequently in violent-crime cases tried in South Carolina. On self-defense, the case illustrates that the threshold for a self-defense instruction is fact-specific and element-specific. Defense counsel pressing for a self-defense charge in multi-party shooting cases should identify evidence supporting each required element—particularly imminence and the inability to retreat—and address those elements explicitly at the charge conference. A defendant who has begun firing into a crowd from a departing vehicle will face a difficult argument that she lacked an alternative means of avoiding danger.
On home detention credit, practitioners should advise clients at the outset of pretrial supervision that time on monitored house arrest does not automatically earn sentence credit. Any conduct during the home detention period that reflects adversely on the defendant—even a subsequently dismissed arrest—can weigh against credit at sentencing. Counsel should consider whether the record of compliance can be affirmatively presented at sentencing as a mitigating factor to support a § 24-13-40 credit award, particularly in cases involving lengthy pretrial home detention.