Background
In 2023, a jury convicted Kendrick Lee of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN) for severely beating his cousin, who suffered permanent brain damage, twice-stopped heart function during helicopter transport, and month-long hospitalization. The trial court sentenced Lee to life without parole (LWOP) under South Carolina’s Three Strikes Rule, S.C. Code Ann. § 17-25-45(B), based on two prior serious-offense convictions: trafficking cocaine and distribution of marijuana within a half mile of a school.
Two issues at jury selection set the stage for reversal. First, Lee raised a Batson v. Kentucky motion after the State struck Juror 191—the only Black juror presented from the panel—citing his prior convictions for simple assault and battery, two instances of disorderly conduct, and criminal domestic violence (all over twenty years old). The State had seated Juror 188 (white), who had a 2011 public disorderly conduct conviction, and struck Juror 186 (white), who had a fraudulent check conviction from 1995. Lee argued the assault-related prior was directly comparable to Juror 188’s disorderly conduct conviction. The trial court asked the State to reconsider placing Juror 191 as an alternate juror; the State agreed.
When Juror 191 re-entered the courtroom, however, he was visibly struggling to hear. He told the court he could only hear out of one ear and had followed only “[s]ome of it” during voir dire. Following an off-the-record bench conference, the trial court excused Juror 191 without making any inquiry into whether his hearing impairment could be accommodated. The court then denied Lee’s Batson motion, finding race-neutral reasons for the State’s strikes and no pretext. Lee was convicted and sentenced to LWOP.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals (Vinson, J.) reversed and remanded on the juror accommodation issue, without reaching Lee’s Batson claim or the other assignments of error.
Under S.C. Code Ann. § 14-7-810, no person is qualified to serve as a juror if “incapable by reason of physical infirmities to render efficient jury service,” and the trial judge makes the final determination. But that authority does not authorize blanket exclusion. The court held that the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits a trial court from concluding that a disability categorically bars jury service; instead, the court must conduct an individualized, disability-specific inquiry into whether the impairment can be accommodated before disqualifying a juror. See Trotman v. State, 218 A.3d 265, 280 (Md. 2019); People v. Guay, 959 N.E.2d 504, 508 (N.Y. 2011); State v. Speer, 925 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ohio 2010). A hearing impairment “does not per se preclude an individual from serving as a juror.”
Here, the trial court excused Juror 191 without any inquiry into potential accommodations and without individually voir diring him as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 14-7-1020 upon a party’s request. Because the trial court made no attempt to explore whether, for example, amplification devices, seating adjustments, or other measures could have enabled Juror 191 to render efficient service, the record contained no evidence to support the disqualification. The court noted that while the trial court expressed understandable concern about whether Juror 191 had heard all voir dire questions, that concern should have prompted an inquiry—not immediate excusal. The court reversed and remanded without addressing the Batson motion, the continuance request, the cascading verdict form, the LWOP challenge, or the other issues Lee raised.
Key Takeaways
- Before excusing a prospective juror based on a hearing impairment under S.C. Code Ann. § 14-7-810, a trial court must conduct an individualized, case-specific inquiry into whether reasonable accommodations would enable the juror to perceive evidence, evaluate it rationally, communicate during deliberations, and follow the court’s instructions; a blanket determination that deafness or hard-of-hearing status disqualifies a juror violates the ADA.
- When a party requests individual voir dire of a prospective juror regarding a potential disqualifying condition, S.C. Code Ann. § 14-7-1020 requires the trial court to conduct that examination; proceeding directly to excusal without it deprives the record of any evidentiary basis to support the disqualification.
- A trial court’s finding of race-neutral reasons for a peremptory strike under Batson does not insulate the proceeding from reversal on an independent ground; here, the improper juror excusal was dispositive and required reversal even though the court did not reach the Batson question.
- South Carolina’s Three Strikes Rule (§ 17-25-45(B)) mandates LWOP upon a third serious-offense conviction; a new trial ordered by the Court of Appeals reopens the entire proceeding, including the jury-selection process that produced the error.
Why It Matters
The decision is a practical reminder to South Carolina trial judges and practitioners that disability-based juror disqualification is not self-executing. When a prospective juror discloses a sensory or physical limitation during voir dire, the constitutionally and statutorily correct response is to pause and investigate: Can the courtroom be configured to help? Can the court provide assistive technology? Can counsel proceed differently to ensure the juror’s full participation? Only after that inquiry can the court make the record needed to support a disqualification on physical-infirmity grounds.
For defense practitioners, Lee flags a reversible error that can arise even in cases where the trial court’s instincts about juror fitness may have been correct. The takeaway is to make a timely request for individual voir dire whenever a juror signals a potential infirmity—creating a record that the court either conducted the required inquiry or did not. For prosecutors, the lesson is to address accommodation options affirmatively on the record rather than relying on a silent off-the-record bench conference, so that a disqualification decision rests on documented findings rather than an unexplained ruling.