Background
Lawrence Wilder was charged in New Hanover County with two counts of misdemeanor communicating threats and five counts of felony intimidating a witness, based on evidence that he was “generally menacing residents in his neighborhood” and specifically intimidating prospective witnesses in pending court proceedings. Wilder had a history of contentious interactions with the court system: he had been found competent to stand trial following a 2023 Central Regional Hospital evaluation, had gone through seven court-appointed attorneys, and had repeatedly claimed he could not afford to retain private counsel while also insisting he was not indigent.
On the morning of trial, Wilder’s seventh court-appointed attorney informed the court that Wilder did not want him to continue as counsel and alleged he had been “drugged” the night before at the jail. Wilder then told the court he wanted to fire appointed counsel, retain a private attorney he claimed to have contacted, and accused appointed counsel of a conflict of interest. The trial judge pointed out that no private attorney had appeared and that Wilder had already had seven appointed lawyers, then asked Wilder directly whether he wanted to represent himself. After extended rambling, Wilder answered: “I guess I’ll represent myself.”
The trial judge then conducted the inquiry required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242, asking ten of the fourteen questions identified in State v. Moore, 362 N.C. 319 (2008). Wilder refused to answer substantively. When asked whether he understood he had a right to counsel, he responded with complaints about Black History Month and past proceedings. When asked whether he understood he would have to follow the Rules of Evidence, he said he was experiencing side effects from being injected with drugs at the jail. When asked whether he understood the court could not give him legal advice, he again deflected to complaints about discovery. The judge denied Wilder’s request to discharge counsel because Wilder “will not answer the questions designed . . . to determine if his waiver of counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”
The jury convicted Wilder of two counts of communicating threats and two counts of intimidating a witness and acquitted him on two additional intimidation counts.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed. A defendant may proceed pro se only if the trial judge is satisfied under § 15A-1242 that the defendant (1) has been clearly advised of his right to counsel; (2) understands and appreciates the consequences of the decision; and (3) comprehends the nature of the charges and the range of permissible punishments. A defendant who invokes the right to self-representation but then refuses to answer the statutory questions deprives the court of the information it needs to make the required findings — and therefore cannot establish a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.
The court first held that Wilder had satisfied the threshold of “clearly and unequivocally” invoking the right to self-representation: after the judge repeatedly pressed him to clarify, Wilder said “I guess I’ll represent myself,” which, read in the context of the full colloquy, was sufficient to invoke the right even though earlier statements had focused on dissatisfaction with appointed counsel. See State v. Lindsey, 271 N.C. App. 118 (2020).
But the invocation was insufficient to compel the court to allow self-representation. Section 15A-1242 permits waiver “only after the trial judge makes thorough inquiry and is satisfied” that the defendant understands and appreciates the consequences of proceeding without counsel. That finding requires answers. When a defendant refuses to respond to the statutory questions — substituting complaints, allegations of mistreatment, and non-responsive statements for substantive answers — the court is left without the information the statute demands. The court distinguished between a defendant who answers but demonstrates misunderstanding (which may weigh against permitting self-representation) and one who never answers at all (which makes any finding of knowing waiver impossible). Without the required showing, the court “should not” permit pro se representation. State v. Graham, 76 N.C. App. 470, 475 (1985).
Key Takeaways
- A criminal defendant who wants to represent himself must answer the trial court’s N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242 inquiry; refusing to answer forfeits the right because the court cannot find a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver without the defendant’s responses.
- Saying “I guess I’ll represent myself” after the court repeatedly pressed for an answer is sufficient to invoke the right to self-representation under the clear-and-unequivocal standard, even after extended complaints about appointed counsel.
- The distinction between invoking the right and establishing a valid waiver is critical: invocation is a threshold act, but permitting self-representation requires the court to be independently satisfied through the statutory inquiry.
- Non-responsive deflections — complaints about jail conditions, medication, or past proceedings — during the § 15A-1242 colloquy do not satisfy the defendant’s obligation to demonstrate comprehension; they leave the record bare and make the waiver finding impossible.
Why It Matters
The right to self-representation under Faretta and its North Carolina statutory counterpart is frequently invoked in cases involving difficult defendants who have already burned through multiple appointed attorneys. Wilder makes clear that a defendant who wants that right must cooperate with the statutory inquiry, not just verbally invoke it. Trial courts facing similar situations are well advised to make a thorough record of the defendant’s refusal to answer, using language like the trial court here: the defendant “will not answer the questions designed . . . to determine if his waiver of counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” That record — preserved in the certified transcript — is what the appellate court will evaluate.
Defense practitioners should note that the court denied the State’s attempt to supplement the appellate record with a prosecuting attorney’s affidavit contradicting the certified transcript’s description of the closing-argument demonstration in the companion Broadway case: “the record imports verity.” The lesson applies equally here — the trial court’s failure to generate an adequate § 15A-1242 record cannot be patched on appeal by post-hoc submissions; the record as certified controls.