The Court of Appeals found no error. The trial evidence supported an inference that Spencer knew the store and employee schedules, positioned himself for a private attack, and waited for the victims to leave. Evidence that he changed clothes, misled his girlfriend, and disposed of the weapon supported flight even though he later appeared near officers. The evidence also did not require a second-degree murder instruction.
The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial. Allowing thirteen jurors to deliberate violated both the governing statute and the North Carolina Constitution’s twelve-juror guarantee. The judge’s mixed instruction to restart but await directions to continue or begin was not the clear, unequivocal safeguard the law requires. The error was both structural in character and prejudicial, so the court did not reach the sentencing issue.
The Court of Appeals found no error. Counsel did not concede guilt to the Pender County charges; the argument attempted to connect incriminating statements to different allegations and focus the jury on the State’s burden. The on-record discussion showed Benson knowingly accepted that strategy. The court also held that the substantial evidence of guilt defeated any showing of Strickland prejudice.
The Court of Appeals reversed. Although evidence supported some findings about the witnesses’ conduct, the supported findings did not show a flagrant constitutional violation that irreparably prejudiced Cuadra’s preparation of his defense with no available remedy other than dismissal. The case was remanded for further proceedings that may include a new trial; a concurrence emphasized the availability of lesser sanctions such as a mistrial.
The Supreme Court reversed on both points. Even assuming portions of the expert testimony crossed the line, Wingate could not show plain error—that the jury probably would have reached a different result without it. The indictment’s factual allegations and the circumstances gave adequate notice despite the incorrect statutory citation.
The Supreme Court modified and affirmed. Under the facts and statutory text, Williams remained a lawful occupant for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2 even after exiting the vehicle during the confrontation. He was entitled to the presumption instruction, and the failure to give it was prejudicial.
Applying State v. Chambers, the Supreme Court rejected a case-by-case constitutional test. The statute is constitutional when its two safeguards are observed: the alternate must not have discussed the case and the reconstituted jury must begin deliberations anew. The Court reversed on substitution, held the suppression issue unpreserved, and remanded for remaining issues.
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Occupancy, proximity, control of the premises, and Norris’s suspicious movement together supplied incriminating circumstances from which a jury could find constructive possession. The Court reversed and remanded for consideration of remaining appellate issues.
The Supreme Court reversed. Although restraint inherent and inevitable in another felony cannot independently support kidnapping, the State presented evidence of extensive additional bindings beyond what the suffocation murder required. Those restraints permitted the jury to find a separate kidnapping and supported reinstatement of that judgment.
The Supreme Court reversed and concluded that McGirt knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived counsel. The written requests, extended history with appointed counsel, and trial court’s questioning showed an unequivocal choice and awareness of the consequences. Because waiver resolved the appeal, the majority did not need to decide forfeiture by misconduct.
The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of certiorari and held that the discretionary framework stated in Cryan applies to all petitions, including criminal matters. Extraordinary circumstances may justify issuance, although obtaining the writ does not predict success on the merits. The reviewing court’s decision is tested for an abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Court held that successive petitions to terminate registration are parts of the same underlying case. The unappealed 2019 tier ruling therefore became law of the case and foreclosed relitigation in the later petition. The Court modified and affirmed without reaching the remaining statutory analysis.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Because the record available during the direct appeal was adequate to litigate the asserted deficiencies and prejudice, Gupton was in a position to raise the claims then. His later motion could therefore be rejected under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419 rather than decided through a new evidentiary proceeding.
The Supreme Court held that the Habitual Felon Act does not prohibit filing the status indictment before the principal-felony indictment. It rejected relief on that ground. On the vehicle count, the Court found insufficient evidence of using the car to keep drugs over time but remanded for consideration of the alternative allegation that it was maintained to sell drugs.
The Supreme Court narrowed the reach of the per se-prejudice rule associated with State v. Harbison. Reading Florida v. Nixon, Strickland, and Cronic together, it held that most claims based on an unconsented concession require proof of deficient performance and prejudice; automatic prejudice is reserved for circumstances in which the defendant is entirely surprised by counsel’s concession. It reversed the remand for an evidentiary hearing.
The Court of Appeals read the form and surrounding record as showing an effective dismissal only of the habitual-felon matter, not the jury’s assault verdict. The trial court had expressly held sentencing open, so it retained authority to enter judgment on the assault conviction. Evidence that Lofton took a route requiring him to jump a fence and discarded clothing while officers pursued him supported the flight inst
The Court of Appeals allowed review but rejected the merits challenges. Viewed in the State’s favor, the evidence supported the obstruction charges and the theory submitted to the jury. The indictments alleged facts supporting the essential elements. Under recent North Carolina Supreme Court precedent, an asserted omission concerning factual detail did not automatically create a jurisdictional defect; Lindsay also fa
The Court of Appeals found no reversible error. The trial judge acted within the broad discretion used to manage voir dire and questioning, including limited leading questions to a minor testifying about sexual abuse. The panel found no plain error in the challenged evidence and no gross impropriety requiring intervention during argument. Because evidence admitted without reversible error could be discussed in closin
The Court of Appeals upheld denial of suppression. Evidence in plain view could be seized where officers were lawfully present and its evidentiary significance was immediately apparent in the violent-crime investigation then underway. Relying on North Carolina precedent involving later comparison of lawfully obtained genetic material, the panel also held that secondary DNA analysis imposed no new physical intrusion a
The North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated a consolidated judgment entering two counts of carrying a concealed firearm under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269(a1) arising from discovery of two guns in a single traffic stop. Applying the rule of lenity under the Conley line of cases, the court held that § 14-269(a1)’s “any pistol or gun” language is ambiguous as to unit of prosecution, permitting only one conviction per incident. The court also vacated a twenty-four-month probationary term imposed without the specific written findings required to exceed the statutory eighteen-month cap.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a defendant who clearly invokes the right to self-representation but then refuses to answer any of the trial court’s N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1242 questions cannot establish a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of counsel, and the trial court therefore did not err in denying the request to proceed pro se.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals arrested judgment on an assault-inflicting-serious-bodily-injury conviction as merging with AWDWIKISI under the double jeopardy clause when no distinct interruption in the assault was established, while affirming that a prosecutor’s one-minute breath-holding demonstration during closing argument was not grossly improper and that a lesser-included offense instruction on assault inflicting serious injury was not required where the State’s evidence of deadly-weapon use was uncontradicted.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed a DWI/fleeing-to-elude conviction, holding that the trial court did not err under Rule 404(b) when it allowed the State to cross-examine the defendant about a prior urban police encounter that contradicted his trial testimony that he “would have pulled over” if approached in the city, and that the Rule 403 determination did not rise to an abuse of discretion despite the evidence’s limited probative value and high prejudice potential.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed convictions for secret peeping, second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor, and third-degree sexual exploitation of a minor arising from hidden charging-block cameras installed in bathrooms, holding that the 1978 “intent to invade privacy” gloss from In re Banks does not apply to the elements of the current N.C.G.S. § 14-202(f) felony secret-peeping statute.