California appellate court rules that defendants must be allowed to argue aggravating sentencing factors to a jury, reversing an upper-term firearm enhancement where the trial court denied closing argument on those factors.
California appellate court reverses juvenile’s commitment to a Secure Youth Treatment Facility because the minor’s most recent offense by date was not a qualifying crime under section 707(b).
The Second District vacated a murder conviction because the trial court improperly added and underlined ‘unintentionally’ in the voluntary manslaughter jury instruction, misleading the jury about when heat of passion applies.
The Second District holds that when a trial court finds a defendant eligible and suitable for mental-health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, requiring a no-contest plea as the price of receiving the same treatment via probation directly conflicts with the statute’s purpose.
The Second District affirms a first-degree murder conviction, holding the trial court had no duty to instruct on attempted murder where the defendant’s brutal attack was a substantial factor in the victim’s death even though the victim had grave preexisting heart and liver disease.
The Second District holds that felony false imprisonment based on menace does not require a threat of force greater than necessary to effectuate restraint — a doctrinal clarification that affirms a domestic-violence conviction.
When resentencing a defendant under section 1172.75, the trial court may reimpose an upper term using aggravating facts the defendant already stipulated to — no new jury findings required.
The Second District holds that hearsay testimony from a preliminary hearing is admissible at a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing if it qualifies as a declaration against penal interest — affirming denial of a gang-shooting resentencing petition.
Second District holds that vacatur of a murder conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6 does not establish an “erroneous conviction” entitling the former defendant to compensation under section 4900, because Senate Bill 1437’s narrowing of murder liability was a legislative act o
Second District holds that Penal Code section 3051 youth offender parole hearings are constitutional as applied to forcible sex offenders sentenced under section 667.6’s full consecutive sentence scheme, finding that section 3051 did not improperly amend Proposition 83 (Jessica’s Law).