The Supreme Court reversed on both points. Even assuming portions of the expert testimony crossed the line, Wingate could not show plain error—that the jury probably would have reached a different result without it. The indictment’s factual allegations and the circumstances gave adequate notice despite the incorrect statutory citation.
The Supreme Court modified and affirmed. Under the facts and statutory text, Williams remained a lawful occupant for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2 even after exiting the vehicle during the confrontation. He was entitled to the presumption instruction, and the failure to give it was prejudicial.
Applying State v. Chambers, the Supreme Court rejected a case-by-case constitutional test. The statute is constitutional when its two safeguards are observed: the alternate must not have discussed the case and the reconstituted jury must begin deliberations anew. The Court reversed on substitution, held the suppression issue unpreserved, and remanded for remaining issues.
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Occupancy, proximity, control of the premises, and Norris’s suspicious movement together supplied incriminating circumstances from which a jury could find constructive possession. The Court reversed and remanded for consideration of remaining appellate issues.
The Supreme Court reversed. Although restraint inherent and inevitable in another felony cannot independently support kidnapping, the State presented evidence of extensive additional bindings beyond what the suffocation murder required. Those restraints permitted the jury to find a separate kidnapping and supported reinstatement of that judgment.
The Supreme Court reversed and concluded that McGirt knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived counsel. The written requests, extended history with appointed counsel, and trial court’s questioning showed an unequivocal choice and awareness of the consequences. Because waiver resolved the appeal, the majority did not need to decide forfeiture by misconduct.
The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of certiorari and held that the discretionary framework stated in Cryan applies to all petitions, including criminal matters. Extraordinary circumstances may justify issuance, although obtaining the writ does not predict success on the merits. The reviewing court’s decision is tested for an abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Court held that successive petitions to terminate registration are parts of the same underlying case. The unappealed 2019 tier ruling therefore became law of the case and foreclosed relitigation in the later petition. The Court modified and affirmed without reaching the remaining statutory analysis.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Because the record available during the direct appeal was adequate to litigate the asserted deficiencies and prejudice, Gupton was in a position to raise the claims then. His later motion could therefore be rejected under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419 rather than decided through a new evidentiary proceeding.
The Supreme Court held that the Habitual Felon Act does not prohibit filing the status indictment before the principal-felony indictment. It rejected relief on that ground. On the vehicle count, the Court found insufficient evidence of using the car to keep drugs over time but remanded for consideration of the alternative allegation that it was maintained to sell drugs.
The Supreme Court narrowed the reach of the per se-prejudice rule associated with State v. Harbison. Reading Florida v. Nixon, Strickland, and Cronic together, it held that most claims based on an unconsented concession require proof of deficient performance and prejudice; automatic prejudice is reserved for circumstances in which the defendant is entirely surprised by counsel’s concession. It reversed the remand for an evidentiary hearing.